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Abstract
The notion that flexible exchange rates insulate a country from foreign shocks is well
grounded in theory, from the classics (Meade, 1951; Friedman 1953), to the more recent
open economy literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). We confront it with new evidence
from Europe. Specifically, we study how shocks that originate in the euro area spill over
to its neighboring countries. We exploit the variation of the exchange rate regime across
time and countries to assess whether the regime alters the spillovers: it does not—flexible
exchange rates fail to provide insulation against euro area shocks. This result is robust across
a number of specifications and holds up once we control for global financial conditions. We
show that the workhorse open-economy model can account for the lack of insulation under
a float, assuming that central banks respond to headline consumer price inflation. However,
it remains puzzling that policy makers are ready to forego stabilization of economic activity
to the extent we found in the data.
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A flexible exchange rate is not of course a panacea; it simply provides an extra
degree of freedom, by removing the balance-of-payments constraints on policy forma-
tion. In so doing, it does not and cannot remove the constraint on policy imposed
by the limitation of total available national resources and the consequent necessity
of choice among available alternatives; it simply brings this choice, rather than the
external consequences of choices made, to the forefront of the policy debate.
Harry Johnson, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969”, Review (Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis), 1969, 51:12-24.
1 Introduction
How much insulation can flexible exchange rates afford the open economy? The classics argue:
a lot—because the exchange rate operates as an automatic shock absorber which adjusts to
soften the impact of external shocks. In addition, flexible exchange rates give monetary policy
an “extra degree of freedom” to pursue its internal objectives autonomously from the rest of
the world (Meade 1951; Friedman 1953; Eichengreen and Sachs 1985). Yet, skepticism about
the virtue of exchange rate flexibility abounds.1 One concern is that monetary autonomy may
remain limited under flexible exchange rates. In recent years, for instance, it has been pointed
out that a US-dominated global financial cycle creates a “dilemma” for domestic monetary
authorities, and severely constrains the effectiveness of their policies (Rey, 2013). At the same
time, a large body of literature has stressed that internationally traded goods and services are
priced to market and/or exchange rate pass through is low, implying that the functioning of the
exchange rate as a shock absorber is impaired (Devereux and Engel, 2003). And yet, state-of-
the-art models predict that domestic output remains fairly insulated from foreign disturbances,
even if, in line with evidence, exports are assumed to be priced in a dominant (vehicle) currency
(Gopinath et al., 2020).2
In this paper we reconsider the insulation properties of flexible exchange rates on the basis of
new empirical evidence and a model-based analysis of the trade-offs that govern monetary policy
decisions in the open economy. We establish new evidence studying the cross-border spillovers
of shocks that originate in the euro area on twenty of its neighboring countries. Irrespective of
the type of euro area shock that we consider, we find that the responses of industrial production,
the unemployment rate, consumer prices, trade flows and the short-term interest rate are very
similar, whether countries pursue a currency peg to the euro, or operate a float3—a finding
we refer to as the “exchange rate insulation puzzle.” Our evidence resonates with the seminal
contribution by Baxter and Stockman (1989), that we replicate in our sample. Like these authors,
1Obstfeld (2020) presents an excellent and all-inclusive review of the literature casting doubts on the benefits
from exchange rate flexibility.
2See their Figure 2: a monetary tightening in the dominant-currency country generates basically no output
spillovers in the other countries when they have a flexible exchange rate regime.
3This is consistent with other recent studies that focus on US monetary policy shocks, but the economics
differ. Notably, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) show that contractionary US monetary policy shocks induce
sizable spillovers to other countries, including in Europe. These authors emphasize that a monetary contraction
in the US tightens global financial conditions, so that international lending falls even though policy rates abroad
decline. We present evidence that suggests our euro-area shocks do not load on US monetary shocks. And we
find little evidence that a financial transmission channel is key for euro-area spillovers. This does not contradict
that the US driven global financial cycle is an important driver of international business cycles.
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we find that business cycle moments do not vary systematically between pegs and floats—
except for the nominal exchange rate which exhibits considerably more volatility in case of a
float.4 Our main contribution is to provide conditional evidence that implies tighter restrictions
on candidate explanations. Namely, we document the effects of identified external shocks on
economic activity, prices and interest rates. The shocks are the same for pegs and floats. The
root source of the “exchange rate insulation puzzle” must thus be something that entails identical
propagation of these shocks in countries pursuing different exchange rate regimes. As discussed
below, a natural candidate from standard open macro theory is a policy choice by floaters to
respond strongly to headline consumer price inflation, masking the insulation that a country
can afford under flexible exchange rates. We should nonetheless stress that, in our findings,
exchange rates volatility is low when assessed conditionally on our identified external shocks,
but considerably higher when assessed unconditionally. This suggests a potentially important
role of shocks, presumably originating in (or propagated by) financial markets, in accounting for
currency volatility (Itskhoki and Mukhin, 2020).
To explore the extent to which insulation may arise from a policy choice, we rely on a
New Keynesian two-country model akin to Gopinath et al. (2020). The model has standard
features: there is a large country, representing the euro area to which we refer as “Foreign”, and
a small country, representing a generic neighbor country; goods markets are not fully integrated
because of home bias; firms may employ imported inputs in production; all exports are priced
in a Dominant Currency Pricing (DCP), reflecting the role of the euro in intra-European trade.5
Monetary policy under floating is modelled as a targeting rule in the output gap and inflation.
We show, both analytically and in a calibrated version of the model, that insulation properties
of flexible exchange rates akin to those observed in the data can be driven by policy choices
shaping monetary stabilization. Namely, the predictions of the model align surprisingly well with
the evidence—there is lack of insulation—if floaters engage in consumer price (CPI) inflation
targeting. Instead, countries enjoy some degree of insulation if their inflation target is specified
in terms of producer prices (PPI), or even full insulation if, more directly, monetary rules give
significant weight to the output gap.
In the model, incomplete exchange rate pass-through under dominant currency pricing means
that monetary policy cannot stabilize both the response of inflation and the output gap to
external shocks at once: there is no “divine coincidence”. Even if currency movements do not
contribute to stabilizing the economy, however, flexible exchange rates still put monetary policy
in the position to stimulate domestic demand when foreign demand falters. But preserving
a high level of economic activity in the face of (inefficient) foreign shocks comes at the cost
of tolerating heightened volatility in exchange rates and inflation. Insulation, then, is not an
inherent automatic feature of flexible exchange rates; rather, it is a policy choice.
While our theoretical analysis is positive rather than normative, we can compare monetary
rules in light of current work on optimal monetary policy under DCP (Corsetti et al., 2020;
4One may note that the fact that Baxter and Stockman (1989) holds in our sample is evidence against possible
systematic differences across countries that opt for alternative currency regimes.
5In our DCP environment, border import prices in the (small) domestic economy are sticky in the currency
of the foreign producers (euros), as is the case in the more conventional producer currency-pricing framework in
Gaĺı and Monacelli (2005). Local currency pricing instead applies to exporters in the small country. They price
exports in euros, the export market’s currency.
2
Egorov and Mukhin, 2020). A robust result emerging from these contributions is that mone-
tary authorities in a small open economy should target domestic marginal costs or equivalently
producer price inflation—a target that does not necessarily coincide with the goal of stabilizing
the output gap, nor with the goal of stabilizing consumer price inflation. As we show using a
calibrated version of our model, if central banks followed rules that approximate the optimal
targeting rule characterized in these contributions, insulation would not be perfect, but would
be much larger than what we find in our data. Hence the puzzle: why are policy makers ready
to tolerate high exposure of economic activity to external shocks in order to pursue a headline
consumer price inflation target? This question provides a new angle on the notion of “fear of
floating”, originally put forward by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in the context of disinflation
policies pursued by emerging economies.
Our empirical analysis deliberately is based on a sample of European countries because this
has several desirable features to study the insulation properties of flexible exchange rates. First,
focusing on the euro area as a source of shocks external to other economies allows us to steer
clear of a global (US-dominated) financial cycle possibly induced by US monetary policy, hence
controlling for Rey’s “dilemma.” Second, there is significant variation in the exchange rate
regime that the neighbor countries maintain vis-à-vis the euro, both across time and countries.
We exploit this variation as we condition spillovers on the currency regime in each neighbor
country at different points in time. The sample includes 20 countries neighboring the euro area
and covers the 20-year period since the inception of the euro in 1999 up until the end of 2018—
providing us with a total of 4,800 monthly observations for a number of key macro indicators.
Over this period, the whole region experiences a strong process of trade and economic integration,
led by the institutional development of the European Union and several trade agreements with
border countries outside the EU. As a result, these countries trade a lot with the euro area.
What is more, and that is the third desirable feature of our data set, their exports to/imports
from the euro area are predominantly priced in euros, thus providing a prime example of the
type of dominant currency setting emphasized by Gopinath (2015).
In order to classify the time-month observations in our sample as pegs and floats we build
on Ilzetzki et al. (2019). In our baseline about one third of the observations qualify as floats
and two thirds as pegs. To assess how different economies respond to euro-area shocks and, in
particular, if and how the response depends on the exchange rate regime, we pool the data for the
neighboring countries, allowing for country fixed effects. We then estimate impulse responses to
external shocks which we interact with a (possibly time varying) exchange rate regime dummy.
We focus much of our analysis on monetary policy shocks as identified by Jarociński and Karadi
(2020), but we also consider their central bank information shocks and a series of spread shocks
following earlier work by Gilchrist and Mojon (2018). Our econometric specification does not
rule out that an external shock causes a change of the exchange rate regime because we condition
impulse responses on the exchange rate regime in the month prior to the shock. In other words,
we allow for the exchange rate regime to be endogenous in the face of external shocks.
As a comparative exercise and a generalization of our analysis, we show that our theoretical
result of (near) equivalence of currency pegs and floats under CPI inflation targeting also holds
in our model when we let large disturbances bring policy rates to their effective lower bound; or
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when we set the exchange rate pass through (ERPT) equal to 100%, the case of Producer Cur-
rency Pricing (PCP). Theoretical results deviate slightly from near equivalence when we assume
that ERPT is symmetrically incomplete—the case of Local Currency Pricing (LCP)—so that
currency movements have no desirable “expenditure switching” effects in either international
or domestic markets. In this case, CPI inflation targeting arguably approximates the optimal
monetary rule.6 In the LCP version of our model, CPI targeting marginally improves insulation
relative to a peg, but also translates into non-negligible exchange rate volatility.
In addition to the studies mentioned above, our work is related to studies that have looked
into the extent of monetary policy independence, and thus the ability of monetary authorities
to stabilize the domestic economy, in the context of the Mundellian trilemma (“Monetary Policy
Independence under Flexible Exchange Rates: An Illusion?”; Goldberg, 2013; Klein and Sham-
baugh, 2015; Obstfeld et al., 2005; Shambaugh, 2004). Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)
analyze empirically how the output performance depends on the exchange rate regime. There is
also earlier work on how the exchange rate regime alters transmission of external shocks (Bay-
oumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Broda, 2004; Giovanni and Shambaugh, 2008). More recently
Jarociński (2020) and ter Ellen et al. (2020) investigate the spillovers from ECB monetary pol-
icy shocks to the US and to Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, respectively. Consistent with our
findings, the latter study finds that interest rate spillovers in Norway and Sweden are almost
indistinguishable from those to Denmark, even though the Danish krona is pegged to the euro.
Lastly, we note that our analysis could also be framed in the classical adjustment model featuring
non-traded goods and a homogeneous traded good (with a price set exogenously in international
markets), recently reconsidered by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016).7
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present our empirical frame-
work, Section 3 shows the empirical results regarding spillovers of euro-area shocks. Section 4
outlines the New Keynesian two-country model. Section 5 presents the main arguments of the
paper for a linearized version of that model and for a special case, but in closed form. Section
6 shows that the main results carry over to a calibrated version of the model with imported
intermediate inputs. The same section also shows the test case of the effective lower bound. A
final section concludes.
2 Empirical framework
In this section we introduce our empirical framework. We rely on this framework in order to
establish new evidence on international spillovers to small open economies. In doing so, we focus
on a group of countries that look—from a global perspective at least—rather homogeneous and
that are, in terms of trade and institutions, firmly integrated, but differ in the exchange-rate
6The normative literature in LCP economies is epitomized by Engel (2011) and Corsetti et al. (2010); for an
early New Keynesian model with limited exchange rate pass-through see also Monacelli (2005).
7In their model, as in ours, macroeconomic adjustment to negative external shocks can imply deeper recessions
under fixed than under flexible exchange rates—full insulation does require extra stimulus of domestic demand. In
engineering this stimulus, the monetary authority has to tolerate a large relative price adjustment of domestically-
produced goods in terms of imported goods in the domestic market—not corresponding to any gains in price
competitiveness in world markets.
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regime that they maintain with a large trading partner in which the shocks under study originate.
Namely, we focus on the euro area as the “source country” and its geopolitical close neighbors
as the “recipient countries”.
In our estimation strategy we exploit the variation of the neighbor’s exchange rate regime
vis-à-vis the euro, not only across, but also within neighbor countries over time. In this section,
we describe the empirical strategy and provide details on our sample as well as the data sources.
Having established this, in the next section we document our main result: that, in terms of
economic activity and inflation, euro-area monetary policy shocks spill over to the neighbors,
the currency of which floats, to much the same extent as to the neighbors that peg to the euro.
We corroborate this result in several dimensions: the empirical specification, the measurement
of the neighbors’ exchange-rate regime, and the shocks in question.
2.1 Estimation strategy
We seek to identify the effect that shocks in the large country have on its smaller neighbors,
and how the neighbor’s choice of exchange rate regime shapes those effects. Toward this end,
let there be a panel of N neighbor countries, indexed by n ∈ {1, ..., N}. And let t = 1, ..., T
denote time. While for most of our results the panel is balanced, it need not be. In terms
of the notation that follows, let variables with a subscript n indicate variables specific to each
neighboring country. Let variables with a bar pertain to the source country. Define a time-
dependent indicator variable In,t−1 that indicates the exchange-rate regime of neighbor n at
time t − 1. In,t−1 = 1 when neighbor n operates a flexible exchange-rate regime vis-à-vis the
large currency union, and zero otherwise.
We estimate local projections for a pooled sample of observations for the neighbors, control-
ling for the exchange-rate regime (Jordá, 2005).8 Toward this end, let h = 0, ...,H mark the
forecast horizon for the local projection. Let εt be a time series of identified structural shocks
that originate in the source country. Let xn,t+h be the dependent variable of interest for neighbor
n in period t + h. Let Nh,t be the set of neighbors that are in the sample for a given period t
and horizon h. For each horizon h = 0, 1, ...,H we estimate the empirical specification
xn,t+h = αn,h + z
′
n,t · βh + γ
p
h (1− In,t−1) εt + γ
f
h In,t−1 εt + un,t+h, n ∈ Nh,t, t = 1, ..., T. (1)
Here αn,h is a neighbor-country fixed effect for horizon h. zn,t is a row vector of controls for
each neighbor country. The time series of the controls are neighbor-specific, but we apply the
same number and type of controls to each neighbor. Accordingly, βh is a conforming vector
that is identical across neighbors. Our object of interest are the neighboring countries’ impulse
responses to the large-country shock, εt, distinguishing neighbors that peg to the euro {γph}
H
h=0
and neighbors that float {γfh}
H
h=0. Toward having consistent estimates of these terms, we assume
that the relation captures the entire effect of the shock on the dependent variable. That is, we
assume that the error term, un,t+h, is uncorrelated with the regressors in εt and In,t−1εt at
all leads and lags. At the same time, the error terms are allowed to be heteroskedastic, and
correlated both in the cross section of neighbors and over time. Toward this end, we compute
8Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (Forthcoming) provide a detailed analysis of how local projections relate to more
traditional VAR estimators.
5
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. Note that the estimated impulse responses
will be economically meaningful as long as the choice of exchange-rate regime is not based
on foresight about future shocks to the large source country. We stress, however, that our
specification does not rule out that regimes In,t−1 evolve over time, in response to changes in
the state of the economy, and that our estimates capture the average response of floats or pegs,
conditional on the pre-shock regime. Likewise, we emphasize that our shock measure εt is a
generated regressor. The standard errors on the generated regressors are asymptotically valid
under the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero (Pagan 1984, Coibion and Gorodnichenko
2015), allowing us to see if spillovers are significant.
We will compare the results to the impulse responses {γh}Hh=0 that emerge from the corre-
sponding local projections in the source country:
xt+h = αh + z
′
t β + γh · εt + ut+h, (2)
where again we assume that the errors ut+h are uncorrelated with εt at all leads and lags. The
error terms themselves can be heteroskedastic and serially correlated. Before proceeding, it will
be useful to be clear about the heterogeneity across neighbors that we allow for in estimat-
ing model (1). In particular, we allow for neighbor fixed effects (the αn,h), and we allow for
heterogeneity unrelated to the shock through allowing for potential serial and cross-sectional
correlation as well as heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Neighbors can be heterogeneous as
to the exchange-rate regime and as to the state of their economy more generally (as captured
by the controls). At the same time, we have to impose some homogeneity across member states
so as to be able to conduct inference in a small sample. Namely, we assume homogeneity across
countries in the coefficients βh, γ
f
h , and γ
p
h. That is, shocks in the large source country can affect
differently neighbors that float and neighbors that peg, but all neighbors that float are affected
by the shock the same way. Still, in our robustness analysis below, we consider estimates based
on mean group estimator and find our main results unchanged.
2.2 Sample
In our application, we resort to a sample of European countries, plus the euro area. This setting,
in our view, provides an ideal test case for how the exchange-rate regime impacts international
spillovers. Not only does it comprise a large integrated economy, the euro area (EA), and a large
number of smaller open economies. But also is each of the neighbors in our sample linked to
the euro-area economy through outright membership of the European Union or by other close
association with the EU. In the sample period we consider, indeed, institutional developments
of the EU and a number of bilateral agreements have activated a process of increasing economic
and trade integration. Because of this process, by global standards, the EA neighbors have
many similarities. We make use of the fact that, in spite of the comparably strong ties with
the EA and similarities, the neighbors differ in their exchange-rate regimes vis-à-vis the euro.
Namely, there is both variation of the exchange rate regime across neighbor countries and over
time.
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2.2.1 The neighbor countries
Our sample consists of monthly data from the inception of the euro in 1999:M1 through 2018:M12.
This gives us at most T = 240 observations for each country. Our sample consists of the 11 coun-
tries that formed the euro area in 1999 (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and N = 20 of its neighbors. The neighbors
are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom. This is the set of countries that at the end of our sample period comprised the
European Union (EU, which the UK left in January 2020 only), plus the three larger countries
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), bar Liechtenstein.9 We collect time series on
several macroeconomic and financial variables of interest. The data are seasonally adjusted and
the source is Eurostat unless noted otherwise in data Appendix A.
2.2.2 Classification of Exchange-rate regimes
For each of the N neighbors and each period t = 1, ..., T , our methodology asks us to classify
the exchange rate regime as a “peg” (In,t = 0) or a “float” (In,t = 1). Rather than resorting only
to judgment of our own, as much as we can, we rely on the careful work by Ilzetzki, Reinhart,
and Rogoff (2019), to whom we refer as IRR for short. We corroborate their evidence, with
our application in mind, based on a reading of central bank communication, communication
by the European Commission via its bi-annual “Convergence Reports,” and the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements. For a large sample of countries (including all of the N
neighbors analyzed here) IRR finely classify the de-facto exchange rate regime using categories
1 (No separate legal tender or currency union) to 15 (Dual market in which parallel market
data is missing). We observe no instance of the latter category in our sample. In case of a peg,
IRR also provide the reference currency. In case there is an official exchange rate arrangement,
they verify if the country’s exchange rate against the reference currency actually follows the
pre-announced rule. Otherwise, they classify the regime on the basis of its observed exchange
rate volatility.
Our theory later makes the case that a flexible exchange rate may not insulate a neighbor
country against external shocks if the neighbor pursues inflation targeting. Under this theory,
the reason is that the exchange rate may not show much fluctuation under inflation targeting.
Since IRR’s classification scheme is based precisely on such observed fluctuations, we need to
strike a compromise. We do so with the intention to err on the side of caution (rather accidentally
labeling a floater as a pegger than vice versa). We label as floaters neighbors in IRR’s categories
9 through 14. At the one end, this includes neighbors that have broad bands or managed
floats against the euro (their category 9). At the other end it includes the 3 percent of our
observations (147 out of 4800) that IRR classify as “freely floating” (their category 13) and a
9The composition of EFTA has been stable over our sample. The EU, instead, saw several waves of accession.
Free access to the European single market typically predates EU membership by several years. An example of
this is Croatia, which had preferential access to the single market since the year 2000, formalized with signing its
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2001 and, thus, before it applied for EU membership
(2003) or joined the EU (2013). All other neighbors that joined the EU over the course of our sample already
had applied for membership prior to 1991:M1.
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Notes: Rows report exchange rate regime in a specific month whenever there is change of the exchange rate
regime in at least one country relative to previous month. Darker cells (1) indicate a floating exchange rate, while
lighter cells (0) indicate a peg, including membership in the euro area; floats are categories 9 through 14 in the
fine classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2019).
few observations of IRR’s category 14 “freely falling,” namely for Romania in 1999/2000. This
definition of floaters is narrow in the sense that it allows the neighbor countries room to use
the exchange rate as a shock absorber. For example, IRR require of managed floats, arguably
the most restricted category among our floaters, that the exchange rate does not fluctuate by
more than two percent per month in 80% of months over a five-year window. Clearly, this still
allows for exchange-rate movements that are larger than two percent about twice per year, and
for notable cumulative changes in the exchange rate. We verify that we observe a great deal of
exchange rate flexibility for country-time observations that qualify as a float according to our
criterion, see Figure B.1 in the appendix.
Table 1 provides a compact overview how we sort countries according to their exchange rate
regime in our baseline specification. Each column refers to one of the 20 neighboring countries
in our sample. Each row refers to a month in which the classification for at least one country
changes relative to the previous month. In the table, the darker cells indicate a float (In,t = 1),
and the brighter cells indicate a peg (In,t = 0), including membership in the euro area. In
total 1773 or 37 percent of our country-time observations qualify as float under our baseline
specification.
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Appendix B provides details on the classification for each of the neighboring countries. Here
we focus on a few examples only, so as to highlight the nature of our exercise. We are interested
in whether the exchange rate of a country is flexible vis-à-vis the euro, or not.10 Bulgaria
is a clear-cut example of a peg. Throughout our sample period it operates a currency board
under which its currency is pegged to the euro. The case of Malta, in turn, demonstrates how
we deal with a neighbor’s transition toward euro membership. In January 2008 Malta joined
the euro area. Our assumption throughout is that Malta and other late-adopters of the euro
are too small relative to the euro-area economy as a whole to have notable weight in policy
decisions or the euro-area’s macroeconomy. Rather, we keep Malta and other late-adopters of
the euro in our sample as having a hard peg with the euro.11 At the end of the sample, all the
late-adopters combined accounted for less than four percent of euro-area GDP. In robustness
analysis, we exclude Greece and Cyprus from the sample because they may have had a non-
negligible effect on euro area policies during the sovereign debt crisis. We find that results are
basically unchanged relative to the baseline.
As a stepping stone to euro membership, a country has to engineer a stable exchange rate
against the euro for some time. Namely, under the Maastricht treaty’s convergence criteria (now
codified in Article 140 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), adopting the
euro requires “the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing
against the euro,” where the latter is typically interpreted as a policy-induced devaluation out
of intent. In theory, the exchange-rate mechanism allows for the exchange rate to fluctuate in a
band of ± 15% around an agreed exchange rate between the euro and the country’s currency,
and this is what Malta announced on May 2, 2005 when entering the Exchange Rate Mechanism.
Yet, as Figure B.1 in the appendix shows, Malta did not nearly exhaust that band. Rather, in
practice neighbors that aim at eventually adopting the euro operate much tighter bands. Indeed,
the exchange rate of the Maltese lira against the euro was basically constant during Malta’s
membership in the ERM and with the exception of Latvia all neighbors that are members of
the ERM are defined as operating a peg. Still, in a robustness exercise below, we use ERM
membership as a criterion to classify a neighbor’s exchange rate regime. Specifically, we classify
as floats all country-months observation for which a country is neither a member of the euro area
nor of the ERM. In this case the group of floaters is considerably larger than in the baseline.
Yet our main result is unchanged.
The clearest cases for a floating exchange-rate regime are the UK, Norway, Poland, and for
the largest part of the sample period, also Iceland. The clearest cases for a peg outside of the
euro zone in addition to Bulgaria are Croatia and Denmark, both of which operated hard pegs
throughout. In sum, our empirical strategy is designed to exploit the variation in exchange-rate
regimes across time and countries in order to identify the effect of the exchange rate regime on
international (monetary) spillovers. The conventional wisdom is that floating exchange rates
help insulate the small open economy from foreign shocks. Going with this, we wish to label a
10In our baseline we also assign Lithuania to the peggers. Even though it maintained a soft peg vis-à-vis the
US$ up to January 2002. Yet from a theoretical point of view it is crucial that a neighbor country may not adjust
its policy stance in the face of an external (ie euro area) shock.
11After 1999:M1, the euro became legal tender in eight countries of our sample: in Greece (2001), Slovenia
(2007), Cyprus (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015).
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neighbor a floater only if the exchange rate truly has room to absorb shocks. Toward this end,
we choose a cautious classification of floaters. We provide extensive robustness checks later.
IRR’s classification ends in 2016M12.12 Based on the evidence that we have, we have left the
exchange-rate classification unchanged for the rest of the sample.
In our theoretical section, we emphasize the role of the inflation targeting regime. Specifically,
we will find considerable spillovers of shocks from the euro area to its neighbors, even if the
neighbor floats. Later, to explain that finding, we will resort to a theory that makes the case
that a strict focus on an inflation target may mask the potential of flexible exchange rates to
insulate a country from external shocks. Therefore, it seems important to note that, indeed,
throughout most of the sample the neighbors that we classify as having floating exchange rates
have operated an inflation targeting regime. The obvious cases are Sweden (since 1993) and the
UK (since 1992). Based on the classification by Brito et al. (2018), Norway started being an
inflation targeter in March 2001, Switzerland in January 2000. Czechia has been an inflation
targeter since 1997, Hungary since June 2001, and Poland started that practice in September
1998. The one country in our sample that we classify as having flexible exchange rates for some
time but that Brito et al. (2018) do not classify as an inflation targeter is Latvia.
2.3 Unconditional business cycle statistics
Before turning to the focus of our analysis—whether the exchange rate regime shapes spillovers
of foreign monetary shocks—we briefly document a number of business cycle statistics, both for
the neighbors with a float and the neighbors with a peg. The composition of these groups varies
over time following our baseline classification based on Table 1. Table 2 reports the standard
deviation for real and nominal variables by exchange-rate regime, averaging across countries, as
well as the correlation with the counterpart in the euro area. We report statistics based on time
series after removing a linear-quadratic trend where applicable or based on growth rates.13
The table shows that, at a first glance, one would be hard-pressed to tell pegs and floaters
apart based on basic business cycle statistics—except on the basis of the standard deviation
of their bilateral exchange rate with the euro, reported in the first line. Depending on the
detrending the volatility of the nominal exchange rate is about 2.5 to 3 times higher for the
floaters. Another noteworthy difference is the standard deviation of short-term interest rates.
It is about twice as high for floaters compared to pegs. Yet the standard deviations of the
other variables look comparable across regimes, as does their correlation with the corresponding
aggregate in the euro area. The evidence in our sample thus confirms the Baxter-Stockman
result of the apparent neutrality of the exchange rate regime—a puzzle originally established by
comparing data from before and after the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system and recently
revisited by Itskhoki and Mukhin (2019).14
In our analysis below, we go a step further. Namely, the evidence in Table 2 is unconditional,
that is, the apparent neutrality may be generated by the simultaneous occurrence of different
12For Poland the lastest observation is for 2016:M09.
13A few countries have seen notable disinflation over the sample, Romania in particular. This is why we resort
to a quadratic trend.
14In related work, Enders et al. (2013) investigate whether the introduction of the euro changed business cycles
in Europe. Comparing the periods 1985–1996 and 1999–2011 for those countries that joined the euro, they also
find business cycle moments to be largely unchanged.
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Table 2: Business cycle moments for pegs and floats
Peg Float
Level∗ First difference Level∗ First difference
σ(xi) ρ(xi, xEA) σ(xi) ρ(xi, xEA) σ(xi) ρ(xi, xEA) σ(xi) ρ(xi, xEA)
FX 4.18 0.80 13.02 2.12
IP 6.97 0.55 3.01 0.16 6.18 0.57 2.5 0.25
u rate 2.66 0.37 0.24 0.22 1.52 0.27 0.19 0.24
i rate 2.61 0.64 0.39 0.21 5.32 0.65 0.96 0.32
HICP 2.32 0.52 0.61 0.32 3.48 0.31 0.66 0.24
PPI 4.04 0.68 0.91 0.45 4.99 0.44 0.88 0.48
Notes: From top to bottom the table reports business cycle moments for the log euro exchange rate (measured
in percent), log industrial production (measured in percent), the unemployment rate (in p.p.), interest rates (in
p.p. annualized), the log of the consumer and producer price index (in percent); from left to right: average
values for neighbors that peg or float (our narrow definition, category 1 in Table 1). We report the standard
deviation of the respective variable and the contemporaneous correlation with the equivalent at the euro-area
level, in levels/removing a linear quadratic trend and after taking first differences. ∗Level after removing a
linear-quadratic trend from IP, HICP and PPI.
Figure 1: Invoicing and trade shares in the euro-area periphery
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Note: data for euro-area neighbor countries, see Section 2 for complete list of countries; here we display data on
invoicing shares for all countries in our sample except for Croatia, and, in the case of export invoicing shares,
Malta. Sources: Gopinath (2015) and IMF Directions of Trade Statistics.
shocks that go in the direction of offsetting any potential benefit from exchange rate flexibility.
In what follows, instead, we reconsider—in the spirit of Gaĺı (1999)—the question of neutrality
conditional on identified shocks. In this way, we seek to shed light on the mechanism that
generates the empirical correlations and to discipline our theoretical exercises.
2.4 Dominant currency
We wish to close the description of our sample with information on the invoicing regime in
intra-European trade. Namely, as will become important when we rationalize the empirical
results later, not only do the neighbors trade a lot with the euro area, but also are their exports
to/imports from the EA pre-dominantly priced in euros. The European setting, thus, serves as
a prime example of the dominant-currency pricing regime that Gopinath (2015) stresses.
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This is illustrated in the two panels of Figure 1. In each panel, the horizontal axis measures
the share of, respectively, exports to the EA and imports from the EA for the countries in our
sample. Against these shares, we plot the share of trade invoiced in euros along the vertical
axis. The figure illustrates the degree of integration of these economies with the euro area and
is suggestive of a dominant role of the euro in intra-European trade, in line with the evidence
put forward elsewhere (Gopinath, 2015; Amiti et al., 2018).
3 The insulation puzzle: evidence from Europe
We are interested in how an external shock propagates to a neighboring country, and how this
propagation depends on the choice of exchange-rate regime. Toward this end, we focus on
shocks that originate in the euro area. Throughout we compare the effect of the shocks in the
neighbor countries, both pegs and float, to what happens in the euro area itself. Because the
composition of the euro area has changed over time and some later members of the euro area
are in our sample as pegs, we focus on the adjustment in the original 11 euro area members
(EA11) whenever appropriate.15
For our empirical strategy we need a measure of structural euro-area shocks. As far as we
can, we wish to rely on measures of such shocks that were identified in earlier work, outside of
the scope of the current paper. For the baseline specification, we chose as counterpart for εt in
models (1) and (2) above, the monetary policy shocks identified Jarociński and Karadi (2020)
for the euro area and updated by Jarociński (2020). These authors combine a high-frequency
approach to identification with sign restrictions. Specifically, they capture surprises in 3-months
interest-rate forwards around euro-area monetary policy events. And they disentangle monetary
policy shocks from central bank information shocks by restricting the sign of the stock market
response to the surprise. Intuitively, monetary policy shocks are shocks which generate a positive
response to the nominal interest rate, and a negative response of the stock market. Our baseline
estimates focus on the transmission of these monetary policy shocks in the euro area to the
neighboring countries. In a series of robustness checks, we verify that our main results are
neither specific to this measure of monetary policy shocks, nor, in fact, specific to monetary
policy shocks in the first place. In our baseline, we include 12 lags of the shock and 12 lags of
the dependent variable in the vector of controls. We find that our results are also robust with
respect to alternative specifications along this dimension.
3.1 Euro-area monetary policy shocks and their spillovers
In what follows we present estimates for the adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shocks,
both in the euro area itself and the neighboring countries. Figures 2.A and 2.B show our
main results. They compare responses in the euro area (left columns) to the responses in the
neighboring countries. The middle columns report responses of neighboring countries that peg
to the euro. The right columns report responses of neighbors with a floating currency. Each
row collects the response of a different macroeconomic or financial time series.
15For industrial production, the unemployment rate, the HICP and the PPI index we construct an aggregate
time series for EA11, see Appendix A. Results for the EA19 series are very similar (and available on request).
This is perhaps to be expected, given the small weight that the late adopters of the euro have in euro-area GDP.
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Figure 2.A: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock identified by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) using high frequency
data and sign restrictions. Left column shows response of euro area variables, middle column the response in
neighbor countries with an exchange rate peg, right column the response in neighbor countries with a flexible
exchange rate; solid line represents point estimate, shaded areas correspond to 68 and 90 percent confidence
bounds based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. Horizontal axis measures time in months.
Vertical axis measures deviation in percent/percentage points.
We normalize the shock to a one-standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock.
In each panel of the figures, the horizontal axis measures time in months while the vertical
axis measures the deviation of a variable from its no-shock level in percent or in percentage
points. The shaded areas represent 68 and 90 percent confidence intervals based on Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) robust standard errors and the solid line corresponds to the point estimate. The
first two rows of Figure 2.A show the response of two key indicators for real activity that are
available at a monthly frequency: industrial production and the unemployment rate. According
to the point estimates, a one-standard deviation monetary contraction in the euro area reduces
euro-area industrial production by a little over half a percent (first row, first column) and
the unemployment rate rises by about 0.1 percentage point (second row, first column). Not
surprisingly, perhaps, the shock affects neighbors that peg to the euro in much the same way as
the euro area itself (middle column). What is surprising, though, certainly against the received
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wisdom, is that there also are sizable spillovers to the neighbors that have flexible exchange
rates. Indeed, there is no evidence that the flexible exchange rate insulates economic activity in
the neighbor countries: the contraction for countries with a flexible exchange rate (right column)
is as strong as in those countries where the exchange rate is pegged to the euro (middle column).
The final row of Figure 2.A shows the response of interest rates as measured by the financing
costs of governments. Jarociński and Karadi (2020) identify the monetary policy shock based
on an event study combined with sign restrictions. It bears noting that their sample, as ours,
features a decade of a varied range of unconventional monetary policies in the euro area, including
asset purchase programs and forward guidance, in an area where there is no common safe asset
(Gertler and Karadi, 2015). Arguably for these reasons, the empirical mapping of the monetary
shock to one measure of euro-area interest rates is not as clear cut. In particular, the left panel
reports the response of one interest rate in the euro area, the one-year rate on German bunds (in
annualized percentage points). This rises on impact, but the response is not persistent.16 The
effect of a change in the euro area’s monetary stance is however detectable through its spillovers
on the interest rates of neighboring countries that peg to the euro. Indeed, interest rates there
rise vis-à-vis the level of measured short term interest rates in the euro area (last row, middle
panel). At the short end the interest rates of pegs and floats evolve comparably (rising about
0.1 percentage point annualized above the short term rate in the euro area). Remarkably, the
effect is somewhat more persistent for peggers, however.
Figure 2.B shows the response of additional variables. It is organized in the same way as
Figure 2.A. The top row displays the adjustment of the consumer price index, as measured by the
harmonized consumer price index (HICP), expressed in percent deviations from the no-shock
level. In response to the shock, consumer prices decline somewhat in the euro area, but not
significantly so. In the neighbor countries there is no significant adjustment either, neither for
pegs nor for floats. The contractionary effect of the monetary policy shock is much more visible
when we consider the response of the producer price index (PPI) in the second row of Figure 2.B,
also measured in percent deviations from the no-shock level. We find that the contractionary
monetary shock in the euro area causes domestic producer prices to fall significantly in the euro
area, namely by about 0.2 percent. Once more, the response of producer prices is of comparable
size in the neighbor countries, regardless of whether they peg to the euro (second row, middle
panel) or float (right panel).
The third row of Figure 2.B shows the response of the exchange rate, measured in percentage
deviations from the pre-shock level. In the left-most column we report the effective exchange
rate of the euro against the currencies of its trading partners. This is measured as the price of
foreign currency expressed in terms of euro. In response to the contractionary monetary shock
in the euro area, the effective exchange rate of the euro appreciates (declines) on impact, the
appreciation of the effective exchange rate also being a clear guide to the nature of the shock.
In the other two columns, we report the bilateral exchange rate of the national currency of the
neighbor countries with the euro. A rise corresponds to a depreciation against the euro. In line
with the construction of our sample, there is virtually no response of the exchange rate among
neighbors that maintain a hard or soft peg (third row, middle panel): by design, neighbors
16In the analysis of Jarociński and Karadi (2020) the one-year rate also increases on impact only (their Figure
8.A, panel B).
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Figure 2.B: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock identified by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) using high frequency
data and sign restrictions. Left column shows response of euro area variables, middle column the response in
neighbor countries with an exchange rate peg, right column the response in neighbor countries with a flexible
exchange rate; solid line represents point estimate, shaded areas correspond to 68 and 90 percent confidence
bounds based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. Horizontal axis measures time in months.
Vertical axis measures deviation in percent/percentage points.
in the “peg” group have limited exchange rate flexibility (see Table 2 above). The currency
of the neighbors that have a flexible exchange rate depreciate somewhat against the euro (the
right-most column) but the effect seems moderate and does not exceed half a percent. In sum,
even though the exchange rate of neighbors that float depreciates somewhat (acting as a “shock
absorber”), we find no evidence that economic activity in practice is better insulated from euro
area monetary policy shocks under a float than a peg.
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The traditional view of the flexible exchange rate as a shock absorber works through in-
ternational expenditure switching. By this a depreciation of the currency of neighbors with
a flexible exchange rate leads domestic and foreign demand to switch towards the goods and
services produced in the depreciating country. So as to probe into this channel, the last row
of Figure 2.B shows the adjustment of the export-to-import ratio, measured in logs relative to
the no-shock level. Expenditure switching would suggest this time series to move in the same
direction as the exchange rate. For the euro area, we report total exports over total imports.
We do similarly for the neighbors, but here we focus on bilateral trade with the euro area only.
A monetary contraction in the euro area reduces this ratio for the euro area moderately, by half
a percent. How about trade between the euro area and the neighboring countries, then? In
the neighboring countries exports rise relative to imports, suggestive of expenditure switching.
This suggests that the spillovers from the euro area to economic activity of its neighbors are not
driven by an adverse movement of net exports. We will take this up in our model-based analysis
below. And once more, the responses for pegs and floats are quite similar. They do not point
toward better insulation of the floaters.
3.2 Robustness analysis
Our main finding is that countries with flexible exchange rates do not seem to be more insulated
from external shocks than countries that peg their currencies to the source country of the shock.
We have established this finding empirically for a euro-area monetary policy shock documenting
its transmission to neighboring countries. This section provides robustness analysis at two
levels. First, in Section 3.2.1, we stick to analyzing the transmission of euro-area monetary
policy shocks. We study the robustness of the results with respect to the set of controls that we
choose and probe into the robustness of our findings by varying the classification of the groups
of pegs and floats. Last, we look into alternative measures of euro-area monetary policy shocks.
Second, in section 3.2.2, we study the extent to which similar “non-insulation” findings emerge
for the transmission of other external shocks.
3.2.1 Euro-area monetary policy shocks
This section reports on the robustness of our findings as to the spillovers of euro-area monetary
policy shocks. Figure 3.A and Figure 3.B show the result of a number of changes in the empirical
specification, as do Figures C.2 to C.5 in the appendix. The figures are organized in exactly
the same way as Figures 2.A and 2.B before. In order to provide a visual benchmark against
which to assess the robustness of our baseline, they report the point estimates under alternative
specifications against the background of the confidence bounds of the baseline specification
(shaded area).
First, we conduct a set of experiments that includes additional controls when we estimate
models (1) and (2). In particular, we have to make sure that the conditional comovement of the
euro area and its floating and pegging neighbors that we find does not originate from a common
shock that is external to both the euro area and its neighbors. One candidate would be a US
monetary policy shock which may trigger a global response of economic activity. Toward this end,
in a first modification of the baseline specification, we include among the controls US monetary
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Figure 3.A: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock: alternative specifications
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock. Left column shows responses of euro area variables, middle (right)
column the response in neighbor countries with pegged (flexible) exchange rate; shaded areas correspond to 68
and 90 percent confidence bounds of estimate for baseline, see Figures 2.A and 2.B for details. Point estimates
for alternative specifications: US monetary policy shocks as additional control variable (red solid line), VIX &
VSTOXX as additional control variables (dashed lines in magenta); no intermediate regimes, that is, we drop
country-month observations with IRR classification between 5 and 9 (blue line with stars), float defined as all
country-month observations where a country is neither in ERM2 nor on euro (green line with circles), mean group
estimator for pure pegs and floats (black solid lines).
policy shocks as identified by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). The results are shown as red solid
lines in the figures, and are virtually unchanged relative to the baseline. Second, we include
implied stock market volatility as measured by the VIX and the VSTOXX as additional control
variables.17 In this way we seek to address concerns that there is a global financial cycle that
affects the euro area and its neighbors alike, causing us to measure cross-border spillovers (Rey
2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020). The results of this analysis are shown as dashed lines
in magenta in the figures. For some variables, notably unemployment and industrial production,
the measured spillovers are somewhat weaker than in the baseline. For others, in particular the
response of producer and consumer prices, they tend to be stronger. Importantly, this happens
for pegs and floats alike. In all of the charts, the spillovers to floaters are at least as large as the
17We also consider both indicators in isolation and find very similar results.
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Figure 3.B: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock: alternative specifications
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock. Left column shows responses of euro area variables, middle (right)
column the response in neighbor countries with pegged (flexible) exchange rate; shaded areas correspond to 68
and 90 percent confidence bounds of estimate for baseline, see Figures 2.A and 2.B for details. Point estimates
for alternative specifications: US monetary policy shocks as additional control variable (red solid line), VIX &
VSTOXX as additional control variables (dashed lines in magenta); no intermediate regimes, that is, we drop
country-month observations with IRR classification between 5 and 9 (blue line with stars), float defined as all
country-month observations where a country is neither in ERM2 nor on euro (green line with circles), mean group
estimator for pure pegs and floats (black solid lines).
spillovers to neighbors that peg.
In a second set of experiments we assess the robustness of our results with regard to the
classification of the exchange rate regime. Naturally, the classification of the neighbors’ exchange
rate regime does not affect the results for the euro area and hence we do not show any new
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results in the left column. First, we omit all country-months observations from our sample for
which the classification of IRR is between 5 and 9, that is, we consider as pegs only regimes
that are operating a de facto peg or a more rigid regime; while as floats we consider exchange
rate regimes that operate on a de facto crawling band narrower than or equal to +/-5% (IRR
classification: 10), or on a more flexible regime. As a result, we loose some 700 observations
(or about 15 percent) of our sample. The results are shown as the blue solid line with stars in
Figures 3.A and 3.B. Second, we adopt an alternative strategy to define a float. Rather than
relying on IRR’s classification as in our baseline, we use ERM2 membership as a criterion: we
define as floats all country-month observations for which a country is neither a member of the
ERM2 nor a member of the euro area. In our sample we have 707 observations with ERM2
membership, and 948 observations with euro area membership. On the basis of this criterion
for a peg, we end up with 3145 floaters (or 65%) of the total. This is a considerably larger
group than in our baseline. Results are shown by the green line with circles in the figure.
Last, in order to address concerns that our baseline model imposes too much slope homogeneity,
we estimate it on a country-by-country basis for those countries for which the exchange rate
regime was stable during our sample period. This allows us to estimate a linear model for each
country (rather than modelling interaction effects between the shock and the exchange rate
regime). We then compute the average impulse response function across countries, that is, the
mean group estimator, separately for pegs and floats (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). For the pegs
the neighbors we consider for this exercise are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece,
Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia.18 For the floats we consider Iceland, Norway, Poland, and
the United Kingdom. As Figure B.1 in the appendix shows, these countries operated a floating
exchange rate almost always during our sample period.19 The results are shown by the black
solid line in the figure. For all three experiments we find that differences relative to the baseline
are moderate. Spillovers to economic activity and producers prices remain large, notably for
floaters.
We further investigate the robustness of our results and verify that the results for our baseline
specification are not driven by specific country groups. For this purpose, we first drop Cyprus
and Greece from the sample since one may be concerned that the developments in these countries
during the sovereign debt crisis may be a source for euro-area monetary policy shocks. Next,
we exclude all EMU accession countries from our sample (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia) because in this case
business-cycle synchronization may be dominated by other factors than the exchange rate regime.
Next, we run the model on a subsample of only Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) as well as
a sample which exclude precisely these countries. In a further experiment we drop observations
for the years 2008–09 from our sample, that is, the period which is arguably dominated by the
global financial crisis (GFC). We show results for these specifications in Figures C.2 and C.3 in
the appendix. We find that our results are basically unchanged as we drop countries or country
groups from our sample. When we drop the GFC period, spillovers are considerably smaller, but
18We do not include Estonia because its exchange rate was perfectly constant in sample.
19In the first two years of our sample period Iceland is assigned an 8 by IRR, afterwards a 9 or more, as are
the other countries in the group of four floaters.
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the effect of monetary policy shock in the euro area itself is much smaller, too. This suggests
that euro area monetary policy shocks during the GFC have had a rather large impact, both in
the euro area and in the neighbor countries. In any case, we find that spillovers are no smaller
for floats than for pegs—exactly as for our baseline specification.
In a last set of experiments, we consider alternative measures of euro-area monetary policy
shocks. First, we draw once more on Jarociński and Karadi (2020) and use their shock series
which is based on what they call the “poor man’s sign restriction.” In this case, rather than
restricting the impulse responses of an estimated VAR model, the authors classify those monetary
surprises as monetary policy shocks for which the stock-market surprise and surprise in the
interest-rate forward have the opposite sign. Second, we use a measure of monetary policy shocks
compiled by Altavilla et al. (2019). This measure, too, is based on high-frequency monetary
surprises and, thus, conceptually similar to our baseline shock measure. But it does not restrict
the sign of the stock market response so as to control for central bank information. Lastly, we
consider an alternative specification which features 6 rather than 12 lags of the shock and the
dependent variable in the vector of controls. We show results for these specifications in Figures
C.4 and C.5 in the appendix. They are generally very similar to those for the baseline. In sum,
we find that our main result is robust across a wide range of alternative specifications: spillovers
from the euro area monetary policy shocks on its neighbor countries are no smaller for countries
with flexible exchange rates than for countries which peg their currencies to the euro.
3.2.2 Spillovers from other shocks
So far, we have focused on euro-area monetary policy shocks. The current section probes into
how general the results are. That is, whether we find the exchange-rate regime appears to have
equally limited effects on the spillovers for other euro-area shocks. For this purpose we once
more rely on estimating models (1) and (2), but we choose shocks other than euro-area monetary
policy shocks to represent εt.
First, we estimate the effect of central bank information shocks in the euro area, as identified
by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) and Jarociński (2020). Intuitively, these shocks account for a
positive co-movement of interest-rate forwards and the stock market around monetary events.
The idea is that a monetary surprise may provide information to market participants, to the
extent that the central bank has more information about non-monetary fundamentals and is
responding to these (see also Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018; Romer and Romer, 2000). The
identification does not reveal the precise type of information advantage of the central bank. It
seems natural to assume, however, that the euro-area monetary authorities have an information
advantage, relative to the market and relative to information revealed by other central banks,
primarily with respect to forces that are specific to the euro-area economy.
Figure 4 shows the adjustment to euro-area central bank information shocks, both in the
euro area and in the neighbor countries. It is organized in the same way as previous figures. In
particular, the left column shows results for the euro area, the middle column for neighbors with
a peg, the right column for neighbors with a float. In the figure, to keep the exposition compact,
we focus on the response of four variables only: industrial production, unemployment, interest
rates, and the exchange rate. In line with the notion that underlies a central bank information
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Figure 4: Adjustment to euro-area central bank information shock
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Central bank information shock identified by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) using high frequency data
and VAR model with sign restrictions. Left column shows response of euro area variables, middle (right) column
response in neighbor countries with exchange rate peg. Solid line indicates point estimate, shaded areas correspond
to 68 and 90 percent confidence bounds. Horizontal axis measures time in months. Vertical axis measure deviation
in percent/percentage points.
shock, we find this shock to be expansionary in the euro area. And, it is expansionary in the
neighbor countries as well. Indeed, we find a very similar picture as with monetary policy
shocks—except that all signs are reversed. The spillovers are positive and sizeable and they
similar for floats and for pegs.
As a second alternative shock, we consider a euro-area credit “spread shock” that we identify
relying on earlier work by Gilchrist and Mojon (2018). Specially, we use their index of credit risk
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Figure 5: Adjustment to euro-area spread shock
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: spread shock identified in recursive VAR estimated using time series of bank credit spread of Gilchrist
and Mojon (2018). Left column shows response of euro area variables, middle (right) column response in neigh-
bor countries with exchange rate peg. Solid line indicates point estimate, shaded areas correspond to 68 and
90 percent confidence bounds. Horizontal axis measures time in months. Vertical axis measure deviation in
percent/percentage points.
for banks in the euro area which, in turn, aggregates individual security level data for Germany,
Italy, Spain and France. We include this time series together with observations for industrial
production, HICP inflation (core), and the EONIA in a VAR model and identify the spread
shock recursively.20
20We obtain the series for the spread from the website at the Banque de France: https://publications.banque-
france.fr/en/economic-and-financial-publications-working-papers/credit-risk-euro-area. We identify the spread
shock recursively, assuming that the variables in the VAR are pre-determined relative to the credit spread. In
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Figure 5 shows the estimated responses to the identified euro area spread shocks. As before,
we show the adjustment in the euro area itself in the left column. Focus first on the third row
of that column. This shows that the spread shock raises the credit spread in the euro area
persistently. The euro-area spread shock induces euro-area economic activity to contract (first
two rows), and the euro to depreciate in effective terms (an increase in the bottom left panel).
As before, there are sizable spillovers to the neighboring countries. The response in economic
activity may be somewhat more muted for floaters, but overall it hardly differs between pegs
(middle panels) and floats (right panels). Just like in the case of a monetary policy shock, the
contractionary effect of a spread shock spills over to industrial production and unemployment of
its neighbors (first and second row). And just like for the monetary policy shock discussed above,
we find a positive response of the measured interest rate differential with respect to the euro area
for the neighbor countries—independently of the currency regime (third row, middle and right
panels). As regards the response of the exchange rate, shown in the bottom row, we find that
the currency of neighbor countries with a flexible exchange rate depreciates against the euro—an
effect that we, naturally, do not observe in the neighbor countries with limited exchange rate
flexibility. But even accounting for this, one may be tempted to conclude that flexible exchange
rates do not seem to offer much insulation against a spread shock that originates in the euro
area.
4 A New Keynesian two-country model
To assess our empirical results in light of theory, we resort to a stylized but tractable open
economy model. The structure of the model starts from earlier work of ours, on which we
draw in our exposition (Corsetti et al., 2017). Relative to this, we allow for the possibility
that prices of domestic exporters are sticky in the currency of a foreign country, the “dominant
currency”, and that firms employ imported inputs in production. Both of these specifications
follow Gopinath et al. (2020).
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. The countries differ only in size, in terms of
their monetary policies, and in terms of the shocks that they are exposed to. The world economy
is populated by a measure one of households. Households on the segment [0, n) belong to the
Home country and the ones on the segment [n, 1] belong to the Foreign country. Later on, we
will assume that the domestic economy is generically small (n → 0). Still, we explicitly model
the structure of both Home and Foreign. This is so because the specifics of the developments
in Foreign impact Home through both trade and financial markets. The main building blocks
of the model are standard. In the following, we thus provide a compact exposition that focuses
on Home. When necessary, we refer to Foreign variables by means of an asterisk.
doing so, we rely on a key result by Gilchrist and Mojon (2018). Namely, while they also consider alternative
approaches, namely a FAVAR and identification by means of an external instrument, these authors emphasize
that results from these alternatives are fairly similar to those obtained under a recursive VAR. We estimate the
VAR on monthly time series for the period 1999M1–2018M12. Since it features 6 lags, our time series of spread
shocks covers the period 1999M7–2018M12.
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4.1 Households
In each country, there is a representative household. Letting Ct denote a consumption index













β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and ξt is a unit-mean shock to the time-discount factor, a
“demand shock” for short. ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and Et
is the expectations operator. The household trades a complete set of state-contingent securities
with the rest of the world. Letting Xt+1 denote the payoffs in t + 1 of the portfolio that
the household has acquired in period t, in units of domestic currency, the household’s budget
constraint is given by
Et {ρt,t+1Xt+1} − Xt + PtCt = (WtHt + Υt)− Tt.
Here ρt,t+1 is the nominal stochastic discount factor. Wt is the nominal wage. Υt are the
domestic firms’ nominal profits. Tt are lump-sum taxes. Pt is the consumption-based price


















Here CH,t and CF,t are the Home-produced and Foreign-produced bundles consumed in Home.
η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the two bundles and υ ∈ [0, 1] measures the home
bias in consumption.21




























where CH,t(j) and CF,t(j) denote differentiated intermediate goods produced in Home and For-
eign, respectively, and ε > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
produced within the same country. All the intermediate goods are traded across borders.
The consumer price index in Home is given by
Pt =
[






21This specification of home bias follows Sutherland (2005) and De Paoli (2009). With υ = 1, there is no home
bias: if the relative price of foreign and domestic goods is unity, Home’s consumption basket contains a share n
of Home-produced goods, and a share of 1 − n of imported goods. A lower value of υ implies that the fraction
of domestically produced goods in final goods exceeds the share of domestic production in the world economy. If
















where PH,t and PF,t is the price of the bundle of imported goods.
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In maximizing utility, the household takes prices as given. Let PH,t(j) and PF,t(j) denote
the domestic currency price of a generic domestically produced and a generic import good,
respectively, the price indices for the bundle of domestically produced goods and for imported






















We let P ∗H,t(j) denote the foreign-currency price that the producer in Home charges for its
good in Foreign. Let P ∗H,t be a price index defined analogously to PH,t. Let Et be the nominal
exchange rate measured as the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. A rise in
Et, thus, represents a nominal depreciation of Home’s currency. We assume that Home’s export
prices are sticky in foreign currency units. The law of one price, thus, does not necessarily hold.
Foreign exports, too, are sticky in Foreign’s currency, making Foreign’s currency “dominant”
for international trade in the sense of Gopinath et al. (2020). We define Mt as the resulting
law-of-one-price gap for domestic goods such that:
MtPH,t = EtP ∗H,t. (8)
For imported goods in Home, the law of one price holds.
PF,t = EtP ∗F,t. (9)
We define the Home terms of trade, St, as the price of imports in Home relative to the price








A rise in St marks a depreciation of the Home terms of trade (Home goods becoming relatively
cheaper).
The household’s problem defines the households’ demand function for Foreign-produced and
Home-produced goods. Demand from domestic consumers for a generic intermediate good pro-


































Intermediate goods producers sell under monopolistic competition and employ labor and inter-




where Ht(j) denotes labor services employed by firm j ∈ [0, n] in period t, Xt(j) is an aggregator
of intermediate inputs employed by firm j, and Zt is a stationary aggregate productivity shock.
The intermediate inputs are produced domestically and abroad, and the intermediate input
aggregator Xt(j) takes the same functional form as the consumption aggregator in equation (4).
Likewise, the bundle of Home (Foreign) intermediate inputs XH,t(j) (XF,t(j)) takes the same
functional form as the Home-produced (Foreign-produced) bundle of final goods consumed in
Home CH,t (CF,t).
Total domestic demand for a generic intermediate good produced in Home consists of the
demand from domestic consumers and the demand from domestic producers







(1− (1− n)υ) (Ct +Xt)
]
, (14)
where me made use of the assumption that consumption bundles and intermediate-input bundles
are isomorphic. Total foreign demand for a generic intermediate good produced in Home consists
of the demand from foreign consumers and the demand from foreign producers








(1− n)υ (C∗t +X∗t )
]
, (15)
where X∗t has the same functional form as C
∗
t .
Each period, Home producers choose the cost-minimizing pair of labor and intermediate







α − (Y Dt (j) + Y D∗t (j))
]
where the Lagrange multiplier MCt(j) represents nominal marginal costs of firm j in period
t. Using the first-order conditions to the cost minimization problem, one can show that firms’







)1−α Pαt W 1−αt
Zt
,
for all firms j, and, therefore, MCt(j) = MCt.
Under a regime of dominant currency pricing, Home producers solve separate price-setting
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4.3 Monetary policy, market clearing and equilibrium
Monetary policy is conducted by adjusting the short-term nominal interest rate:
Rt ≡ 1/Etρt,t+1.
The monetary regime in Home and Foreign will be defined further below. We allow for monetary
shocks in Foreign to shift Foreign inflation, interest rates, and economic activity. In equilibrium,
domestic prices and foreign sales prices, respectively, of all firms will be identical. So that
demand from domestic households is






and demand from foreign households is















































Finally, in equilibrium, household behavior and international financial market clearing give rise
to the familiar international risk sharing condition.
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4.4 Focus on the small open economy
From here onward, we will focus only on the limiting case n → 0. The Foreign consumption
basket will almost exclusively contain Foreign-produced goods. The consumer and producer
price level in Foreign, therefore, will coincide. Effectively, the Foreign economy operates like
a closed economy. From the perspective of the small open Home economy, Foreign can be an
important source of shocks, though, transmitted across borders through financial markets and
trade.
5 Transmission of foreign monetary shocks: analytical insight
Empirically, we have found that the exchange rate regime appears to make little difference as
to the insulation of domestic activity from foreign shocks; recall Section 3. The new-Keynesian
model specified above provides a stylized framework for thinking about how the transmission of
foreign shocks may vary with the exchange-rate and monetary regime. In this section we will
first build analytical intuition—using a tractable version of the model obtained by imposing a
few simplifying parametric assumptions. Then, in the next section and the appendix, we will
provide extensive numerical simulations using a calibrated version.
The goal of the section is to explore a possible reason for the apparent insulation equiva-
lence across exchange rate regimes. Namely, especially in a dominant-currency regime world,
insulating domestic economic activity from adverse foreign shocks requires stimulating domestic
absorption. This in turn, requires a depreciation of the exchange rate and a—temporary—rise
in inflation. By its design, inflation targeting prevents this, inducing the very output spillovers
even under flexible exchange rates.
5.1 An analytically tractable version of the model
To obtain sharp and clear results, we focus on a model variant without round-about-production
of intermediate goods, that is, we set α = 0, and make the following additional assumptions.
First, we set the trade elasticity to unity, η = 1 and assume an infinitely elastic labor supply,
ϕ = 0. As we show below, these assumptions imply that the terms of trade are exogenous and
constant, reducing a model with two endogenous state variables (st−1 and mt−1) to a tractable
variant that only has one (mt−1). For tractability, we also focus on the limit β → 1, and restrict
the process of shocks as specified in subsection 5.5 below. Throughout this section, we consider
a linear approximation of the model around a deterministic and symmetric zero-inflation steady
state.24 As regards notation, small letters corresponds to the percentage deviation of a variable
from the non-stochastic steady state, and variables without a time index mark the variable’s
steady-state value. By way of example, y∗t := log(Y
∗
t )− log(Y ∗) marks the percentage deviation
of Foreign output from its steady state.
24The market value of initial wealth in Home and Foreign, respectively, is influenced by all shocks that affect
the economies, the structural features, as well as by the monetary regime(s). In a linear approximation, however,
initial wealth is without material consequences for the dynamics of the model economy. Therefore, we focus
on a symmetric steady state so as to keep the exposition tractable. It is well understood that higher-order
approximations should not abstract from the market value of initial wealth (see, for instance, Corsetti et al.,
2019). Welfare, or the effects of risk are not in the focus of the current paper.
28
5.2 Equilibrium conditions for Foreign
The equilibrium conditions for the large foreign economy follow the conventional closed-economy














t , κ > 0. (19)
linking Foreign inflation to economic activity. Last, we need to specify Foreign monetary policy.








linking the foreign interest rate, inflation and output. Here φ > 1, γ ≥ 0, so foreign monetary
policy obeys the Taylor principle and the equilibrium is determinate. εm∗t is the foreign monetary
policy shock, the transmission of which to the Home economy the current section studies.
5.3 Equilibrium conditions for Home
In the (small) Home economy, the dynamic IS-relation in Home links output with the real
interest rate and the law of one-price gap according to
yt = Etyt+1 − (rt − Et(πH,t+1 + υ∆mt+1)) . (21)
The Phillips curve that governs sales prices of Home goods in Home is given by
πH,t = EtπH,t+1 + κ [yt + υmt] . (22)




H,t+1 + κ [yt − (1− υ)mt] . (23)
The Home terms of trade evolve according to
st = st−1 + π
∗
t − π∗H,t. (24)
And the law-of-one-price gap, mt, follows
mt = mt−1 + et − et−1 + π∗H,t − πH,t. (25)
Last, the international risk sharing condition combined with the demand for Home-produced
goods is given by
yt = st + y
∗
t + (1− υ)mt. (26)
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Consumer-price inflation in Home is given by the average of inflation rates in the Home con-
sumer’s basket
πt = (1− υ)πH,t + υ(π∗t + ∆et). (27)
Armed with the Foreign variables, equations (21) to (27) combined with a monetary policy rule
in Home (to be specified) then form a system of eight variables in eight unknowns for the Home
economy.
5.4 The natural-rate benchmark for Home: flexible prices in Home
Before spelling out the effect of the monetary regime on shock transmission, it is useful to derive
the natural-rate output in Home. With flexible prices, the level of output in Home is given by
ynt = 0. (28)
That is, with a unitary trade elasticity, Foreign and Home outputs are neither complement nor
substitute. If prices were perfectly flexible in Home (but not necessarily in Foreign), output in
the Home economy would be completely insulated from Foreign monetary shocks, regardless of
the effects of these shocks in the Foreign economy. Furthermore, the natural-rate terms of trade
are given by
snt = −y∗t . (29)
Under flexible prices, the terms of trade would absorb any demand effect from Foreign output.
This is true for any evolution of the foreign monetary shock. For analytical tractability, we
restrict the process that governs the monetary shock next.
5.5 The Foreign response to its own monetary shock
For the remainder of this section we consider a specific shock scenario. Let the two economies
be in their non-stochastic steady state prior to period t = 0. In period t = 0, there is a unitary
monetary shock, that is, εm∗0 = 1 (a foreign monetary tightening). In the next period, the shock
remains present at that level with probability µ. Else, the shock ceases, being equal to zero
forever after. The same applies to each subsequent period. As is well-known, this shock induces

















L. Once the shock ends, foreign variables
immediately return to their steady state of zero. Proposition 1 spells out the evolution of the
foreign economy.
Proposition 1. Consider the (large) foreign economy in Section 5.2 amid the shock structure
sketched above. Define A := 1(1+γ−µ)(1−µ)+κ(φ−µ) . While the shock lasts, output in Foreign will
be
y∗L = −(1− µ) ·A. (30)
Inflation in Foreign will be
π∗L = −κ ·A. (31)
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The interest rate in Foreign will be
r∗L =
[
(1− µ)2 − κµ
]
·A. (32)
Proof. Use equations (18) through (20) along with the Markov assumption for the monetary
shock.
The result of the shock is a contraction in foreign economic activity and inflation, owing to
the increase in the real interest rate in Foreign. Observe that the nominal interest rate will rise
if and only if (1 − µ)2 − κµ > 0, that is if the shock itself is not overly persistent (µ not too
large). All the propositions shown below are valid for any µ ∈ [0, 1). When verbally discussing
the sign of responses (and the intuition behind those), we will focus on the case in which Foreign
interest rates rise when its monetary policy tightens, the conventional response.
5.6 The transmission of Foreign shocks by Home monetary policy regimes
We are interested in understanding the role of the exchange rate as a shock absorber, in relation
to the monetary policy regime adopted by a small open economy. Our point of departure
is the observation that, with world trade priced in a dominant currency, there is no “divine
coincidence.” That is, regardless of the monetary regime pursued in Home, the natural allocation
in which the output gap is closed and there is zero inflation cannot be attained. In Proposition
2, we formalize this result stressing an important property of our simplified model specification.
Proposition 2. Lack of divine coincidence. Consider the same assumptions as in Propo-
sition 1, but focus on the Home economy described in Section 5.3. Then, regardless of the
monetary regime in Home, the terms of trade do not respond to the Foreign shock
st = 0 for all periods t.
Proof. Solve for π∗H,t using (24). Use this to substitute for π
∗
H,t in (23). Similarly, in the same
equation, substitute for the yt from (26). Using the Markov structure of the shock, this leads to
a second-order difference equation in st, the exogenous driving term of which – while the shock
lasts – is κy∗L+π
∗
L(1−µ) (and is zero thereafter). From (30) and (31), this sum is equal to zero.
The difference equation is homogeneous, rendering st = 0 for all t.
To appreciate the meaning of this proposition, contrast its prediction with what happens
under flexible prices. In the natural allocation, in response to the shock, the terms of trade
would move to insulate the Home economic activity from foreign monetary shocks, recall equa-
tion (29). Rigid prices in a dominant-currency pricing regime, instead, rule out this stabilizing
movement. Indeed, the terms of trade do not move whatsoever. Any insulation of the Home
economy, therefore, will have to come from supporting domestic absorption. Stimulating domes-
tic absorption, however, asks for tolerance of domestic (GDP deflator) inflation. Precisely, the
extent to which monetary policy authorities tolerate output spillovers from foreign monetary
shocks depends on the extent to which they tolerate inflation.
We articulate this point in the three propositions to follow, characterizing the evolution of
the Home economy for three monetary and exchange-rate regimes, targeting, respectively, the
natural output, the exchange rate and the CPI inflation. We start with a regime that perfectly
targets natural output, that is, it ensures that the output gap remains closed. As before, in terms
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of notation, let yLt mark output in period t if the shock still lasts in period t, and correspondingly
for all other variables.
Proposition 3. Natural-output targeting. Consider the same assumptions as in Proposition
2. Suppose that Home monetary policy aims to completely stabilize domestic output, or equiva-
lently, the output gap (that is, it targets yt = y
n
t = 0). Let A > 0 be as defined in Proposition 1.
Then, while the foreign monetary shock lasts, the following is true:
1. by the policy regime, output is not affected by the shock in Foreign, yLt = 0.




κ ·A = − υ
1− υ
π∗L.




[1− µ+ κ] ·A, and πLt =
υ
1− υ
κ ·A, t > 0.




[(1− µ) + κ(t+ 1)] ·A.







(1− µ)2 − κµ
]
·A. (33)
Proof. Natural output does not move (Section 5.4), so output gap targeting yields (1.). Solving
for mt from (26) with yt = 0 and st = 0 (Proposition 2), using Proposition 1 and the Markov
structure of shocks, (22) gives (2.). (24) with st = 0 gives π
∗
H.t. Using this with the law of
motion for mt and πH,t in (25) gives (4.). Uncovered interest parity (UIP) follows from taking
the difference between (21) and (18), and using (24) and (25). UIP gives (5.). Using the
aforementioned results in (27) gives (3.).
Proposition 3 highlights that Home monetary policy can in theory completely stabilize eco-
nomic activity in the face of the foreign shock. The proposition also highlights what is required
to bring this about. Namely, since with a dominant currency, there is no divine coincidence,
stabilizing output comes at the expense of higher producer-price and consumer-price inflation.
Since the terms of trade do not contribute toward expenditure switching by Foreign households,
all stabilization of output has to come from domestic absorption. That is, the central bank in
Home needs to induce domestic demand and engineer enough expenditure switching by Home
households. This is achieved by a sharp monetary expansion, that translates into a deep de-
preciation of the exchange rate on impact. As this in turn passes through to Home-currency
consumer prices of imports, the depreciation amid rigid prices is central to expenditure switch-
ing by Home households toward Home-produced goods. Note that this switching occurs in spite
of the fact that the price level of Home-produced goods expressed in Home currency also rises
on impact. Corollary 1 further highlights the response of the Home nominal and real rate of
interest in Home.
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Corollary 1. Consider the same conditions as in Proposition 3. Then the following is true:
1. The Home nominal rate of interest rLt falls if the Foreign interest rate, r
∗,L
t , rises.
2. The Home real rate of interest, rt − Etπt+1, is constant.
Proof. The first item follows from (32) and (33). The second item follows from yt = 0 in all
periods, the Home IS equation (21), (24) (with st = 0) and (25), and the definition of consumer
price inflation (27).
In sum, insulating Home output from a fall in foreign economic activity means stimulat-
ing domestic demand and tolerating producer-price and consumer-price inflation. This marks
one end of the policy spectrum in which Home monetary policy can position itself. The next
proposition shows the other end: a regime of fixed exchange rates.
Proposition 4. Fixed exchange rate. Consider the same assumptions as in Proposition 3.
The one difference is that Home monetary policy targets et = 0 (operates a peg). Then, while
the shock lasts the following is true:
1. Home output evolves according to
yLt = −(1− µ) ·A = y∗L.
2. Home producer price inflation is given by
πLH,t = −κ ·A = π∗L.
3. Home consumer price inflation is given by
πLt = −κ ·A = π∗L.
4. By design, the nominal exchange rate is constant eLt = 0.
5. The Home interest rate is given by rLt − r∗L = 0.
Proof. Uncovered interest parity and fixed exchange rates give (5.). For the remainder, guess
yt = y
∗
t . With this, from (26) and Proposition 2, mt = 0. Using (22), the Markov structure of
the shock, yt = y
∗
t and Proposition 1 gives (2.). Using (27) and the law of motion for pi
∗
t , (3.)
follows. With these results, the guess for yt is easily verified.
The fixed exchange rate means that Home monetary policy gives up the ability of stabilizing
its business cycle and insulating the Home economy from Foreign shocks. On the contrary, the
Home monetary policy follows the Foreign policy one-to-one, so as to keep the peg. Thus, Home
imports Foreign’s monetary stance and with it both the foreign recession (one-to-one) and the
drift in the foreign price level (one-to-one again). The home economy moves in lockstep with
the Foreign economy.
Between the two extreme regimes above, there are many others. We now turn to a monetary
regime that, even if exchange rates are flexible, does not afford much insulation. The following
proposition focuses on CPI inflation targeting.
Proposition 5. Targeting consumer price inflation. Consider the same conditions as in
Proposition 2. Let Home monetary policy target stable consumer prices (πt = 0). Then, while
the foreign monetary shock lasts, the following is true:
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1. Home output evolves according to
yLt = y
∗




υ[2− α− µ] + κ
·A,
where α = 1 + κ/(2υ)−
√
[1 + κ/(2υ)]2 − 1, so that α ∈ (0, 1).
2. Home producer price inflation is given by
πLH,t = −υαt
κ(1− µ)
υ(2− α− µ) + κ
·A.
3. Home consumer price inflation, by construction is zero, πLt = 0.
















−(1− υ)(1− αt+1) κ(1− µ)








Proof. See Appendix D.
Targeting consumer price inflation insulates consumer prices from the Foreign shock, but at
the expense of a pronounced fall in output in Home. Indeed output in Home falls along with
Foreign output. The more so, the more open the economy is (the lower the home bias, that is,
the closer υ to unity) or the more rigid prices are. Second, in the extreme, if prices were perfectly
rigid, κ = 0, CPI inflation targeting would have exactly the same consequences as pegging the
exchange rate. That is, under the special parameterization we use in this subsection, an economy
that operates a float but targets consumer price inflation would—in terms of its responses to
a foreign monetary shock—be indistinguishable from an economy that pegs outright. In this
sense, inflation targeting may mask the potential of flexible exchange rates to insulate domestic
activity from foreign shocks. Under a dominant currency regime, insulation of output requires
a depreciation of the currency, which raises consumer prices, a rise that CPI targeting prevents.
The appendix provides further results that help put the findings above into context. First,
we show that in a dominant currency pricing regime, inflation targeting invites output spillovers,
even if the target is not consumer-price inflation. Namely, Appendix E provides the producer-
price inflation targeting counterpart to Proposition 5. It shows that also if Home monetary
policy were to target producer prices (instead of consumer prices), policy would fail to insulate
domestic output. Output in Home falls along with Foreign output if somewhat less so than
under CPI inflation targeting. Second, we highlight how important the dominant-currency
regime is for the spillovers. Toward this end, Appendix F provides the same scenarios as above,
but assumes that there is producer-currency pricing. As is well-known, under producer-currency
pricing there is divine coincidence: targeting producer prices induces the flexible-price allocation
in Home (Gaĺı and Monacelli, 2005). This insulation is automatically provided by the flexible
exchange rate, in the following sense: that the nominal interest rate in Home does not need to
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move at all to bring about the insulation. Still, the appendix shows, if the central bank were to
target consumer price inflation instead of producer price inflation, it would invite some output
spillovers. Throughout this section, we have focused on the transmission of a Foreign monetary
policy shock only, and we have restricted ourselves to the case of perfectly elastic labor supply.
Appendix G presents analytical solutions relaxing both assumptions. Namely, the appendix
presents derivations for any ϕ ≥ 0 and for all the possible foreign shocks that we spelled out
in the model section, Section 4. The main insight survives: also for other shocks, targeting
inflation in a dominant-currency regime may mask the insulation properties of flexible exchange
rates. We illustrate this, next, in a calibrated version of the model.
6 Numerical simulations
This section resorts to a calibrated version of the model, so as to quantitatively discuss how
the policy regime shapes international spillovers. The calibration deviates from the case of a
unitary trade elasticity and infinite elastic labor supply of Section 5, and accounts for a non-zero
share of intermediate inputs in production.25 Compared to the previous analytical section, these
assumptions imply that, in response to a Foreign monetary shock, natural output in Home is
no longer decoupled from Foreign economic activity, and the model can no longer be solved by
pencil and paper.
After presenting our parameterization next, in line with our empirical analysis we will first
discuss the transmission of a shock to monetary policy in the foreign economy. Thereafter, we
will conclude extending our analysis to insulation at the effective lower bound (assuming that
the two economies are subject to large but asymmetric saving shocks).
6.1 Calibration
Table 3 documents the baseline parameterization. One period corresponds to one quarter. Most
parameters are standard. Following Gopinath et al. (2020), we set the terms of trade elasticity
η = 2, the share of intermediate inputs in production α = 2/3, and home bias 1−υ = 0.7.26 We
should also stress that, under our calibration, the slope of the Phillips curve is reasonably flat.
6.2 Foreign monetary policy shock
We simulate impulse responses to a Foreign monetary policy shock of 100 basis points (annual-
ized). The Foreign policy rate follows a Taylor-type feedback rule
r∗t = ρr∗r
∗
t−1 + (1− ρr∗) (απ∗π∗t + αy∗ ỹ∗t ) + ε∗t , (34)
where ỹ∗t is the Foreign output gap. The monetary policy shock ε
∗





t , where ε
∗
t is a serially independently distributed innovation. Following Gopinath
25The use of imported inputs in the production of export goods is well documented. Gopinath et al. (2020)
show that imported input use is an important factor for open-economy models to match the empirical evidence
on exchange rate pass-through into import and export prices.
26The value of υ is consistent with average import and export shares of EU countries vis-à-vis the EA19
countries.
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Table 3: Baseline parameterization
Parameters Description Values
β Discount factor 0.995
ϕ Inverse of labor supply elasticity 0.4
ε Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 10
η Trade elasticity 2
υ Share of imported goods 0.3
α Share of intermediate inputs in production 2/3
ω Price adjustment costs 300
et al. (2020), we set ρr∗ = 0.5, απ∗ = 1.5, αy∗ = 0.5/4, and ρε∗ = 0.5. The effect of the monetary
shock is shown in Figure 6. So as to allow direct comparison with our empirical results in Section
3, the outline of Figure 6 follows the same structure as the earlier figures. Namely, the left column
shows the response of the large Foreign economy that is the source of the shock. The other two
columns report the responses in the small open Home economy, which can either peg (middle
column) or float (right column).
The response of Foreign variables to Foreign’s monetary shock is shown in the left column.
The increase in the interest rate (reported in the bottom panel) leads to a decline in Foreign
output and consumer price as well as producer price inflation (first to third row). The middle
column of Figure 6 shows the response of the small open Home economy when this pegs its
exchange rate to the Foreign currency. Under the peg, the Home monetary stance is dictated
by the external anchor. The Home interest rate increases in lock-step with Foreign’s, so the
interest differential is nil (bottom row). Home output and inflation fall one-for-one with their
Foreign counterparts.
The right column of Figure 6, instead, shows the response of the Home economy under flexible
exchange rates. Figure 7 collects, for the case of the floats, the responses of external variables.
Our paper argues that a floating exchange rate does not automatically insulate from external
shocks but that it matters how monetary policy uses the room provided by flexible exchange
rates. We, therefore, show the responses for three alternative monetary policy regimes, all of
which have floating exchange rates: consumer price inflation targeting πt = 0 (black line with
squares), producer price inflation targeting πH,t = 0 (blue line with circles), and output gap
targeting ỹt = 0 (red line with diamonds), each for all periods t.
27 The output gap is the gap
with respect to flex price output, with ỹt := yt − ynt .
In line with our analytical section above, the extent to which Home output is insulated from
the Foreign shock varies considerably with the monetary policy regime in Home. Remarkably,
under consumer price inflation targeting, the response of Home output is very similar to the one
under the peg (black line with squares, first panel). The Home monetary authority increases
the interest rate (bottom panel) in order to support its own currency’s value and so contain
import price inflation. The policy trade-off is apparent: the increase in the Home real interest
rate depresses Home producer price inflation (third row) and economic activity. The left panel
27In Appendix I, we consider the case where Home monetary policy is governed by an interest-rate feedback
rule rather than by a targeting rule.
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Figure 6: Adjustment to Foreign monetary policy shock
Foreign Home: peg Home: float
Note: Inflation rates and interest rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations from steady state. ∆
Interest rate denotes the difference between the response of the Home and Foreign interest rate.
of Figure 7 shows the corresponding response of the exchange rate. Under consumer price
inflation targeting, the exchange rate hardly moves in equilibrium. Remarkably, the responses of
Home variables under consumer price inflation targeting are quite consistent with our empirical
evidence of Section 3 for euro area neighbor countries that pursue a floating exchange rate
regime.
It should be clear that the lack of output insulation is a policy choice. Even under DCP,
flexible exchange rates render it possible for domestic policy to shield the level of Home economic
activity from the external shock, though at the cost of heightened variability of inflation. This is
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Figure 7: Home float: Adjustment of external variables to Foreign monetary policy shock
Exchange rate Terms of trade Export-Import ratio
Note: Inflation rates and interest rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations from steady state.
exemplified by the output gap targeting regime. Focus once more on the right column of Figure
6, but now focus on the red line with diamonds. Stabilizing Home output at its natural level—
which declines slightly in response to the foreign shock due to the drop in demand in Foreign for
intermediate inputs—requires a cut in the Home interest rate, to stimulate aggregate demand in
Home (bottom panel). Given the size of the monetary expansion in Home, relative to Foreign, the
Home exchange rate depreciates substantially (see left panel of Figure 7). Under DCP, the role
of the exchange rate as a shock absorber is limited. Specifically, since exports are priced in the
foreign currency and those export prices are rigid, the depreciation does not induce immediate
expenditure switching by Foreign households or firms toward Home-produced goods. Indeed, the
terms of trade barely move on impact (center panel of Figure 7). Expenditure-switching effects
of the exchange rate are only felt in Home: imported inflation reflecting the strong exchange
rate response induces a change in the composition of consumption by Home households and
the composition of intermediate inputs used by Home firms. Both switch toward domestically-
produced goods helping to stabilize Home output. Clearly, insulating domestic output from the
foreign shock is not a free lunch. It requires the willingness of the Home monetary authority to
tolerate an increase in both consumer price and producer price inflation. For the parametrization
here, too, DCP breaks the so-called divine coincidence and induces a trade-off between inflation
and output gap stabilization that—under flexible exchange rates—has to be resolved by the
Home monetary authority.
This trade-off is also apparent under producer price inflation targeting, an intermediate case
between consumer price inflation and output gap targeting (blue lines with circles). Under
producer price inflation targeting, Home output falls less than under consumer price inflation
targeting but more than under output gap targeting. On the one hand, in response to the
tightening of Foreign monetary policy, the decline in external demand for Home export goods
puts downward pressure on marginal costs of firms in Home and, thereby, on Home producer
price inflation. On the other hand, the depreciation of the Home exchange rate raises the price
of firms’ imported inputs and puts upward pressure on Home marginal costs. For our baseline
calibration, the second channel dominates and the Home monetary authority has to raise the
interest rate slightly in order to stabilize producer prices in Home (the bottom panel shows
the interst differential with respect to Foreign). Consequently, the real interest rate increases,
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resulting in a fall in Home output below its natural level.
The conclusion from our theoretical analysis is that in large part the reason for the apparent
lack of insulation that we observe in the data may lie with the incidence of imported inflation
in the objectives of central banks in relatively open economies. A primary instance is consumer
price inflation targeting. But this incidence is also increasing in the share of imported inter-
mediate inputs, making imported inflation relevant to both producer price and consumer price
inflation targets. In either case, such targets make monetary policy lean against exchange rate
movements, bringing the economy to operate closer in line with the case of an exchange rate
peg.
Most strikingly, this conclusion is not predicated on the lack of divine coincidence in the
first place. This point is shown in the extension of our theoretical analysis that we include
in Appendix I. There we show that even in economies where pass through is symmetrically
high (complete) in all countries–the case of Producer Currency Pricing—it will still be true
that the distance between a peg and inflation targeting is small when the central bank targets
consumer prices (arguably suboptimally so). Conversely, the same applies to economies where
pass-through is symmetrically low—the case of Local Currency Pricing (LCP). In this case,
currency movements have no expenditure switching effects, either at Home or abroad.
6.3 Insulation at the effective lower bound
So far, we have focused on typical small or moderate business cycle shocks that allowed us to
abstract from the effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates. Being able to choose
domestic policies that differ from those in Foreign may, however, be even more important in the
case of large adverse disturbances that drive global interest rates to the ELB. Although sample
limitations prevent us from relying on our empirical model to bear on periods of the effective
lower bound, we can still assess the role of the exchange rate regime theoretically. We thus
conclude this section with a simulation of a global recession.
To use the model under an ELB constraint, we focus on the following perfect-foresight
scenario. In period 1, Foreign and Home households are hit by large negative preference shocks
that reduce their desired consumption. The Foreign preference shock is larger than the Home
preference shock. This raises the question how Home can deal with the external shocks. Both
shocks gradually die out over the next nine periods and remain at their steady states thereafter.
For convenience of exposition, foreign monetary policy pursues strict inflation targeting. For
Home monetary policy we consider alternative regimes. Figure 8 shows the responses in Foreign
and Home.
The left column of Figure 8 shows the responses of Foreign variables. The shock reduces
aggregate demand and puts downward pressure on inflation in Foreign. The central bank lowers
the interest rate to cushion the shock and the ELB constraint becomes binding. Once the shock
has died out, the central bank instantaneously raises the interest rate back to steady state, and
output and inflation in Foreign are perfectly stabilized.
The middle column shows the evolution in Home, when the Home exchange rate is pegged
to the Foreign currency. The Home central bank lowers the interest rate to the ELB, in lockstep
with monetary policy in Foreign. The reduction in the interest rate is too small, however, to
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Figure 8: ELB scenario
Foreign Home: peg Home: float
Note: Inflation rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations from steady state. Interest rates are
expressed in annualized percent.
prevent a large decline in Home inflation—by pegging, the Home country ends up importing the
Foreign deflationary drift. Home deflation in turn leads to an increase in the real interest rate
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and a decline in Home aggregate demand via intertemporal substitution. The Home terms of
trade appreciate (not shown). This induces expenditure switching by Home households towards
Foreign goods, thereby further weakening the demand for goods produced in Home. In short,
given that Foreign is at the ELB, pegging to it amplifies the negative effect of the shock to
Home, combining it with an endogenous contraction in the monetary stance. The external
nominal anchor works against Home, by destabilizing the price level. This may still be better
than a flexible rate, if the Home monetary stance fails to expand more than Foreign. But this
need not be so.
The right column shows the evolution in Home, when Home pursues a flexible exchange
rate regime. In Appendix I, we show that the previously considered inflation-targeting regimes
achieve only very limited improvement in output stabilization compared to an exchange rate
peg.28 Targeting the output gap provides some additional insulation of output; in line with
the intuition that we developed in the previous sections. But, then, one may object that both
inflation targeting and output gap targeting treat past deviations of inflation and the output
gap from target as essentially immaterial for current interest-rate policy.29 This “bygones are
bygones” property of the two strategies is known to hamper macroeconomic stabilization at
the ELB.30 In Figure 8, therefore, we consider two alternative monetary policy responses in
Home, price level targeting and cumulative output gap targeting, that seek to compensate, at
least in part, for past episodes of low inflation (economic activity) by temporarily aiming for
a rate of inflation (economic activity) above steady state (potential output). Such history-
dependent policies are known to have desirable stabilization properties at the ELB, and have
been considered by central banks as an alternative to inflation targeting in recent monetary
policy strategy reviews.31 Also with these policies, the results remain consistent with our earlier
findings: the nominal targets are notably less effective at stabilizing real activity than they could
be.
Under price level targeting, the Home monetary authority aims to keep the price level close to
a pre-announced target path. In our simulations, we distinguish between consumer and producer
price level targeting. Under consumer price level targeting, the Home monetary authority aims
to stabilize the consumer price level pt ≡ pt−1+πt, which it achieves whenever the ELB constraint
is not binding. Formally, Home’s monetary policy is characterized by
pt(rt + r) = 0, pt ≤ 0, rt ≥ −r, (35)
where r is the steady state interest rate. Likewise, under producer price level targeting, the
Home monetary authority aims to stabilize the producer price level pH,t ≡ pH,t−1 +πH,t. Under
cumulative output gap targeting, our history-dependent counterpart to the more conventional
28In related work (Corsetti et al., 2017), we have argued that, everything else equal, this outcome is more
likely if the shock originates in Foreign, rather than at home. Without a peg constraining the Home monetary
policy, inflation targeting then allows monetary authorities to maintain the economy on a path much closer to
full employment and stable inflation.
29Past realizations of inflation and the output gap may have an indirect effect on contemporaneous monetary
policy through their effect on the two endogenous state variables, the lagged terms of trade and the lagged
law-of-one-price gap.
30See, for instance, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for a discussion based on a closed-economy model.
31The Federal Reserve announced in August 2020, that it seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2% over time.
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output gap targeting, the Home monetary authority seeks to stabilize the cumulative sum of
past and present output gaps ŷt ≡ ŷt−1 + ỹt.
Returning to the right column of Figure 8, we observe that consumer price level targeting
(black line with squares) achieves little, if any, insulation of Home output. The stronger decline
in the Foreign preference shock leads to a depreciation of the Home exchange rate which puts
upward pressure on Home consumer prices via rising import prices. The ELB is thus not a major
constraint for Home monetary policy. Under consumer price level targeting, the monetary au-
thority in Home lowers the interest rate only gradually, and while the ELB constraint is binding
from period 5 to 8, the Home consumer price level remains close to steady state throughout the
simulation. In other words, under consumer price level targeting the history-dependent motive
does not come to fruition, and, hence, the effect on macroeconomic stabilization remains neg-
ligible in our simulation. Flexible exchange rates would, again, provide little stimulus for real
activity (but would insulate the price level).
Producer price level targeting (blue line with circles), instead, mitigates the decline in Home
output relative to inflation and output gap targeting. Amid an initial drop in Home producer
price inflation the Home monetary authority lowers the interest rate to the ELB. Forward-looking
private-sector agents then anticipate that the monetary authority keeps the interest rate low in
the future, until producer price inflation has risen sufficiently to bring the price level back in
line with the target. The Home monetary authority lowers the ex-ante real interest rate and
thereby mitigates the decline in current output and inflation. In other words, agents’ inflation
expectations operate as an “automatic stabilizer”. This intertemporal channel is complemented
by a depreciation of the Home exchange rate that is stronger than for consumer price level
targeting and which leads to expenditure switching by Home households and firms towards
domestically-produced goods.
Finally, cumulative output gap targeting (red line with diamonds), is associated with the
largest improvement in the response of Home output. Under cumulative output gap targeting,
the Home monetary authority is willing to tolerate permanently higher price levels in order to
compensate for the cumulative sum of negative output gaps during the ELB episode. Doing
so requires a more accommodative interest rate path than under the two price level targeting
regimes. The anticipation of the accommodative future monetary policy stance leads to an
increase in both consumer and producer price inflation on impact. Consequently, the real interest
rate falls and stimulates aggregate demand in Home. At the same time, the exchange rate
depreciates more strongly than under the two price level targeting regimes, supporting the
insulation of production in Home. Finally, it is worth pointing out that while Home output
temporarily overshoots after the ELB episode, the overshooting is much smaller than the sum
of output losses during the ELB episode. This reflects the fact that Home potential output falls
quite a bit in response to the drop in Foreign demand.
An important literature has analyzed the benefit of a credible peg to moderate the costs
of the effective lower bound, starting with Armenter and Bodenstein (2005). Their argument
underlies the analysis by Cook and Devereux (2016) and Groll and Monacelli (2020) who stress
possible benefits from a currency union in a liquidity trap. The idea in these papers is that the
foreign price level is relatively stable compared to what can be achieved by monetary policy at
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home. As long as purchasing power parity holds in the long run, a credible peg then amounts to a
credible price level target—which helps prevent deflationary spirals at the effective lower bound.
Note that these arguments are perfectly in line with our main message that flexible exchange
rates can provide insulation. First, the shocks that we look at have an external component such
that the price level in Foreign falls. Flexible exchange rates allow the Home monetary authority
to engineer an impact jump depreciation of the exchange rate—and so limit disinflation and loss
in economic activity. Second, for the additional insulation provided by flexible exchange rates
to show, the Home monetary authority has to use this flexibility to its advantage and engineer
a relatively expansionary monetary stance. Monetary authorities that manage to do so put the
extra degree of freedom stressed by Harry Johnson in the introductory quote to good use.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we reassess the traditional notion that a flexible exchange rate can insulate open
economies from the adverse effects of external shocks. We first provide new empirical evidence for
Europe that is at odds with this very notion. We then delve into theory in light of considerations
which may give rise to “flexibility pessimism”. A leading concern is that, even if there is
considerable movement of exchange rates, this may not bring about desirable relative price and
demand adjustment, because pass through on the import and export prices is low—in recent
contributions, this problem has been associated with a dominant currency paradigm.
At an empirical level we produce novel evidence for Europe studying spillovers from the euro
area on a large set of neighboring countries, which adopt different exchange rate regimes over
different periods. We show that spillovers are sizeable but not distinguishable across flexible and
fixed exchange rate regimes. At the theoretical level, we study cross-border spillovers in a New
Keynesian model, where shocks originate in the (large) country issuing the dominant currency.
The model generally predicts a high degree of insulation under a flexible rate—unless monetary
policy either pegs the currency or pursues inflation targeting focusing on headline CPI inflation.
In these two cases insulation is comparably low since the interest rate moves in a direction that
mutes exchange rates movements. Remarkably, the result goes through whether or not pass
through into import prices is low, that is, whether the model assumes DCP or PCP. And the
choice how to float remains of equal importance when considering the insulation from foreign
disturbances when rates are at the ELB.
What is puzzling in our analysis is that, while the evidence lends empirical support to the
“flexibility pessimism”:—insulation is equally poor whether or not a country pursues a peg—
the leading concerns motivating this pessimism may be largely unwarranted. Lack of insulation
does not necessarily follow from a low degree of pass through, nor from the ELB constraint on
monetary policy. Rather, it may be rationalized with the simple observation that, facing trade-
offs across different objectives, monetary authorities resolved them in favor of CPI stabilization.
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Unless noted otherwise our data source is Eurostat and the sample runs from 1999:M01–
2018:M12. In what follows we list details and exceptions.
Industrial production: manufacturing (series: sts inpr m), Index (2015=100), seasonally ad-
justed. First observation: 2000:M01, except for euro area, Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia, United
Kingdom, and Norway (all 1999:M01), Switzerland (2010:M10). For Iceland no data from Euro-
stat, use OECD (series: PRMNTO01) instead (only available up to 2018:M02). To construct an
aggregate series for EA11 we use the 2015 weights reported by Eurostat for the construction of
the EA19 series and reweigh series accordingly. In some instances we use OECD data for 1999
as Eurostat data not available for that year, as well as for Ireland after 2010.
Unemployment rate: harmonized unemployment rate according to ILO definition (series:
ei lmhr m), seasonally adjusted. First observation: 1999:M01, except for Bulgaria (2000:M01),
Estonia (2000:M02), Croatia (2000:M01), Cyprus (2000:M01), Malta (2000:M01), Iceland (2003:M01),
Switzerland (2010:M01). To construct an aggregate times series for EA11 we compute time series
for labor force using Eurostat data for the number of unemployed as well as the unemployment
rate. We sum the over all EA11 countries to compute the total number of unemployed and
divide by the total labor force.
Interest rates: short-term interest rates for the euro area, for Croatia (since 2002:, with some
observations missing afterwards), Romania (since 1999:M01), Bulgaria (since 1999:M09) from
Eurostat (series: irt_st_m). For other countries we use OECD data (series: STINT), available
since 1999:M01, except for Malta and Cyprus where we use long-term interest rates (source:
ECB) to proxy for short-term rates. In our analysis we also use the interest rate on German
government bonds with one year maturity from the Bundesbank (Term structure of interest rates
on listed Federal securities (method by Svensson) / residual maturity of 1.0 year / monthly data.
We remove a linear trend from the series prior to the estimation.
Harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP): All-items HICP, 2015=100 (series: prc hicp midx).
First observation: 1999:M01, except for Switzerland (2004:M12). We construct the series for
EA11 using the annual HCIP country weights reported by Eurostat for the computation of the
EA19 series.
Producer price index (PPI): Domestic output price index - industry (series: sts inppd m).
First observation: 2000:M01, except for euro area, Denmark, Lithuania, Sweden, United King-
dom (1999:M01), Estonia (2002:M01), Latvia (2001:M01), and Switzerland (2003:M05). For
Iceland no data from Eurostat, use FRED Economic data instead (series: ISLPPDMMINMEI,
available since 2006:M06). To construct a series for EA11 we use the country weights for in-
dustrial production reported by Eurostat. In case Eurostat does not provide data for individual
EA11 countries we use OECD data (except for Austria for which no data available for 1999).
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Euro-exchange rates: for neighbor countries national currency per euro (monthly average).
For countries that adopt euro in sample we use historical series (ert_h_eur_m) available up to
2015:M12, afterwards euro exchange rate is irrevocably fixed. For other countries we use the
series ert_bil_eur_m. For the euro area we use the effective exchange rate of the euro from
FRED Economic Data (series: NBXMBIS).
Export-Import ratio of neighbor countries with euro area: trade statistics of Eurostat
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/international-trade-in-goods/data/database. For
neighbor countries reporting country is EA19: imports from neighbor country n are exports of
neighor country to EA, likewise exports of EA to neighbor n are neighbor’s imports. First ob-
servation is generally 2002:M01. We compute the log ratio of exports-to-imports. For EA we
compute total exports-to-import ratio (source: Haver).
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B Exchange rate polices in neighbor countries
Here we provide a brief overview of the exchange rate policies of the EA neighbor countries
from 1999 to 2018. Figure B.1 displays for each country in our sample the time series of the
fine exchange-rate regime classification of IRR, measured against the left axis (1-14, since there
are no instances of 15 in our sample), and the month-on-month change of the bilateral euro
exchange rate, measured against the right axis (in percent). The shaded area indicates country-
month observations that qualify as a float in our baseline (IRR category 9 or higher). Table
1 in the main text summarizes this information in a compact way. In what follows we look at
each country in more detail and provide details on the classification of IRR. When appropriate,
we also provide information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), the convergence reports by the European Commission, or
the websites of the central banks.
Bulgaria: Currency board in place since 1997 under which the Bulgarian Lev (BGN) is pegged
to Deutsche Mark and to the Euro afterwards. IRR classification: 2 (“Pre announced peg or
currency board arrangement”).
Croatia: According to the central bank the “monetary policy framework is based on maintain-
ing the stability of the nominal exchange rate of the kuna against the euro.” IRR classification:
4 (“De facto peg”).
Cyprus: Adoption of the euro on January 1, 2008. IRR classification: 1 (“No separate legal
tender or currency union”) since then. On May 2, 2005 Cyprus joined the ERM2, but the
exchange rate fluctuations were much narrower than the +/- 15% margin permitted under
ERM2. IRR classification from 1999-2008: 4 (“De facto peg”); see also Central Bank of Cyprus
website.
Czechia: CPI-Inflation targeting since 1998. From November 2013 to April 2017, exchange
rate target as an additional monetary policy instrument, to avoid koruna to strengthen below 27
CZK/EUR (see Convergence programme of the Czech Republic, April 2017). IRR classification:
4 (“De facto peg”). IRR classification throughout 1999: 8 (“De facto crawling band that is
narrower than or equal to +/-2%”), since 2000:M01: 11 (“Moving band that is narrower than
or equal to +/-2%”).
Denmark: Denmark is a member of the ERM2 for the whole sample priod, but it pegs the
Danish krone (DKK) against the euro allowing for a fluctuation band of only +/- 2.25% (see
website of the Danish central bank). IRR classification: 2 (“Pre announced peg or currency
board arrangement”).
Estonia: In the early part of our sample the Eesti kroon is pegged to euro via a currency board
arrangement. In 2004, Estonia joined the ERM2, in January 2011 the euro. IRR classification:
2 (“Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement”) and 1 (“No separate legal tender or
currency union”), before and after, respectively.
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Notes: each panel displays the fine exchange-rate regime classification of IRR against the left axis (1-14, since
there are no instances of 15) in our sample), and the month-on-month change of the bilateral euro exchange rate
against the right axis (in percent). The shaded area indicates country-month observations that qualify as a float
in our baseline (IRR category 9 or higher).
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Greece: Adoption of the euro following a currency peg on January 1, 2002. Greece was
member of the ERM2 until the end of 2001. IRR classification: 4 (“De facto peg”) and 1 (“No
separate legal tender or currency union”), before and after, respectively.
Hungary: Since 2001 inflation target (see website of the Hungarian central bank) and freely
floating exchange rate since February 2008 (see website of the Hungarian central bank). Prior
to October 2001, the currency followed a crawling peg to a currency basket of composed of the
euro (70%) and the USD (30%), allowing for horizontal bands of ± 2.25%. In May 2001, the
size of the bands was increased to ± 15%. Furthermore, the reference currency was changed to
the euro in 2001. This regime was upheld until 2008. IRR classification: 9 (“Pre announced
crawling band that is wider than or equal to ±2%”) up to 2003:M04, 10 (“De facto crawling
band that is narrower than or equal to ±5%”) up to 2009:M03 and 8 (“De facto crawling band
that is narrower than or equal to ±2%”) since then.
Iceland: In 1999 and 2000 the Icelandic króna (ISK) was pegged to a basket of nine currencies
(the Canadian dollar, the Danish krone, the euro, the Japanese yen, the Norwegian krone, the
pound sterling, the Swedish krona, the Swiss franc, and the U.S. dollar) allowing for horizontal
bands of +/- 9%. IRR classification: 8 (“Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or
equal to ±2%”). In March 2001 this peg was dropped in favor of an inflation target. However,
a subordinate goal of exchange rate stabilisation was formulated, which gives the central bank
a mandate to intervene on the foreign exchange markets (see website of the central bank of
Iceland). According to the AREAER, disruptions on the international financial markets from
2008 onward led the central bank to intervene on the foreign exchange markets to stabilise
the currency. IRR classification 1999–2008: 8 (“De facto crawling band that is narrower than
or equal to ±2%”), up 2011:M09: 12 (“De facto moving band ±5% , Managed floating), 11
(“Moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%”) since then.
Latvia: Up to 2004:M12 peg to IMF special drawing rights. Switch from peg to euro peg
on January 1, 2005 with ±1% bands. Joined ERM2 in May 2005 (see website of the central
bank of Latvia). Since June 2009 de facto peg to euro, joined euro in January 2014. IRR
classification from 1999:M01–2001:M07: 10 (“De facto crawling band that is narrower than or
equal to ±5%”), up to 2004:M12: 8 (“De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to
±2%”), up to 2009:M06: 11 (“Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%”), up to
2013:M12: 2 (“Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement”), and 1 (“No separate legal
tender or currency union”) since then.
Lithuania: Up to 2002 the Lithuanian litas (LTL) was pegged to the US dollar by means
of a currency board arrangement. On February 2, 2002 this peg was transformed into a euro-
peg. In 2004 Lithuania joined the ERM2 without changing its effective exchange rate regime
(AREAER). Adoption of the euro on January 1, 2015. IRR classification up to 2014:M12: 2
(“Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement”) and 1 (“No separate legal tender or
currency union”) since then.
52
Malta: In the early part of the sample the Maltese lira was pegged to a currency basket, with
weight of euro increased in August 2002. Peg to euro only started in January 2005, and adoption
of the euro on January 1, 2008 (AREAER). IRR classifiction: 11 (“Moving band that is narrower
than or equal to ±2%”) up to 2000:M12, 7 (“De facto crawling peg”) up to 2007:M12; 1 (“No
separate legal tender or currency union”) afterwards.
Norway: Floating exchange rate rate. Since March 2001 CPI inflation target. IRR classifica-
tion: 11 (“Moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%”).
Poland: Up to March 2001 Polish zloty (PLN) was pegged to a currency basket consisting
of the euro (55%) and the US dollar (45%). The peg followed a crawling and pre-announced
central exchange rate to its reference basket. On March 24, 1999 the fluctuation band of the
exchange rate around this central rate was increased from +/- 12.5% to +/- 15%. Floating
exchange rate since April 2000 (AREAER). IRR classification up to 1999:M03: 10 (“De facto
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±5%”) and 12 (“De facto moving band ±5%,
Managed floating”) afterwards.
Romania: Central bank maintains “managed float, in line with using inflation targets as a
nominal anchor for monetary policy and allowing for a flexible policy response to unpredicted
shocks likely to affect the economy” (see central bank website). With the exception of the
period from 2002 to 2004, the IMF has also classified the exchange rate regime of Romania as
a managed float (AREAER). In August 2005, the central bank adopted an inflation target (see
central bank website). Romania has set 2024 as its target year to adopt the euro, but has not
joined the ERM2 yet (see European Commission website). IRR classification up to 2001:M01:
14 (“Freely falling”), up to 2004:M07: 8 (“De facto crawling band that is narrower than or
equal to ±2%”), up to 2006:M06: 12 (“De facto moving band ±5%, Managed floating”), up to
2011:M11: 7 (“De facto crawling peg”), and 4 (“De facto peg”) since then.
Slovakia: Adoption of the euro following a managed float on January 1, 2009 (AREAER).
Joined ERM2 in 2005. IRR classification up to 2008:M12: 8 (“De facto crawling band that
is narrower than or equal to ±2%”), and 1 afterwards (“No separate legal tender or currency
union”) .
Slovenia: Adoption of the euro following a managed float on January 1, 2007. Joined ERM
II in June 2004. IRR classification up to 2001:M08: 8 (“De facto crawling band that is narrower
than or equal to ±2%”), up to 2006:M12: 4 (“de facto peg”) and 1 afterwards (“No separate
legal tender or currency union”) .
Sweden: Inflation targeting since 1993; floating exchange rate. IRR classification up to
1999:M01: 12 (De facto moving band ±5%, Managed floating), up to 2008:M08: 6 (“De facto
crawling peg”) and 11 (“Moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%”) since then.
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Switzerland: Free float before September 6, 2011 and after January 15, 2015. Exchange rate
floor equivalent to a de facto peg in the period in between. IRR classification up 2011:M8: 11
(“Moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%”) , up to 2014:M12: 2 (“Pre announced
peg or currency board arrangement”), and 11 since then.
United Kingdom: CPI inflation target since 1992. Flexible exchange rate. IRR: classifica-
tion up to 2000:M12: 12, up to 2008:M12: 11, and 13 since then.
C Alternative specifications of empirical model
Figure C.2: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock: alternative specifications
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock. Left column shows responses of euro area variables, middle (right)
column the response in neighbor countries with pegged (flexible) exchange rate; shaded areas correspond to 68
and 90 percent confidence bounds of estimate for baseline, see Figures 2.A and 2.B for details. Point estimates
for alternative specifications: Cyprus and Greece not in sample (red solid line), No EMU accession countries
in sample, that is, we drop Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia (dashed line in magenta), only Eastern European countries in sample, that is, only
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (blue line
with stars), no eastern European countries in sample, that is the complement of the previous selection (green
with circles), drop observations for financial crisis 2008–09 (black solid line).
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Figure C.3: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock: alternative specifications
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock. Left column shows responses of euro area variables, middle (right)
column the response in neighbor countries with pegged (flexible) exchange rate; shaded areas correspond to 68
and 90 percent confidence bounds of estimate for baseline, see Figures 2.A and 2.B for details. Point estimates
for alternative specifications: Cyprus and Greece not in sample (red solid line), No EMU accession countries
in sample, that is, we drop Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia (dashed line in magenta), only Eastern European countries in sample, that is, only
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (blue line
with stars), no eastern European countries in sample, that is the complement of the previous selection (green
with circles), drop observations for financial crisis 2008–09 (black solid line).
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Figure C.4: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock: alternative specifications
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock. Left column shows responses of euro area variables, middle (right)
column the response in neighbor countries with pegged (flexible) exchange rate; shaded areas correspond to 68
and 90 percent confidence bounds of estimate for baseline, see Figures 2.A and 2.B for details. Point estimates for
alternative specifications: monetary policy shocks identified using poorman’s condition (red solid line), monetary
policy shocks measured as monetary surprises in EA-MPD (dashed line in magenta), 6 (rather than 12) lags of
shock and dependent variable as controls.
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Figure C.5: Adjustment to euro-area monetary policy shock: alternative specifications
Euro area Neighbors with peg Neighbors with float
Notes: Shock is one-standard deviation shock. Left column shows responses of euro area variables, middle (right)
column the response in neighbor countries with pegged (flexible) exchange rate; shaded areas correspond to 68
and 90 percent confidence bounds of estimate for baseline, see Figures 2.A and 2.B for details. Point estimates for
alternative specifications: monetary policy shocks identified using poorman’s condition (red solid line), monetary
policy shocks measured as monetary surprises in EA-MPD (dashed line in magenta), 6 (rather than 12) lags of
shock and dependent variable as controls.
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D Proof of Proposition 5 (CPI inflation targeting with DCP)
This section derives the formulae in Proposition 5 of the main text. The proposition shows the
evolution of the economy in the regime with dominant currency pricing under strict consumer-
price inflation targeting.






mt = mt−1 + π
∗
t + ∆et − πH,t (36)
By assumption, there is strict consumer-price inflation targeting, πt = 0, which by the definition
of consumer price inflation, (27), means πt = (1 − υ)πH,t + υ(π∗t + ∆et) = 0. Solving this for
π∗t + ∆et, and substituting in (36) gives




or πH,t = −υ∆mt. In turn, substituting this into Phillips curve (22) gives
−υ∆mt = −υEt {∆mt+1}+ κ [yt + υmt] .
Using risk sharing condition (26) to substitute for yt (with st = 0 again) gives
− υ(mt −mt−1) = −υEt {mt+1 −mt}+ κ [y∗t +mt] . (38)
We solve (38) using the method of undetermined coefficients. We do so first for the case that
shocks have already ceased in period t, then for the case that the shocks still prevail in period t.
Suppose that the shocks have already ceased in period t. Guess that for any such period t, mt =
α ·mt−1, with |α| < 1. Using this guess in (38), with y∗t = 0 (since shocks have already ceased
by assumption), and solving for the stable root gives α = 1 + κ2υ −
√
[1 + κ/(2υ)]2 − 1. Next,
suppose that the shocks still prevail in period t. Guess that while shocks last, mLt = α ·mLt−1+ϑ.
Then
Et {mt+1 −mt} = µ(mLt+1 −mLt ) + (1− µ)(αmLt −mLt )
= µ[(α− 1)mLt + ϑ] + (1− µ)(α− 1)mLt
= (α− 1)mLt + µϑ,
where µ is the probability that the shock continues to last next period.
Using this in (38) along with the solution for y∗t gives, after matching coefficients,
ϑ =
κ(1− µ)
υ(2− α− µ) + κ
A.





υ(2− α− µ) + κ
A. (39)
Use this in (37) to solve for the formula for πLH,t that is given in item (2.) of the proposition.
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For the evolution of output in item (1.) of the proposition set st = 0 in risk sharing condition
(26), use the law of motion for foreign output from Proposition 1, and use (39).
So as to obtain item (4.) of the proposition, observe that consumer price inflation targeting




πH,t − π∗t , (40)
so that while the shocks persist (using the law of motion πLH,t)
∆eLt = (1− υ)αt
κ(1− µ)
υ(2− α− µ) + κ
A− π∗L. (41)
Substituting for π∗L from Proposition 1, one obtains the law of motion for e
L
t in item (4.) of the
proposition.
So as to derive the interest-rate spread, item (5.) of the proposition, we use the uncovered
interest parity (UIP). UIP itself follows from taking the difference between the IS equations in
Home and Foreign, (21) and (18), and using (24) and (25) to simplify. UIP is given by
rt − r∗t = Et{∆et+1}. (42)
Use this to derive the formula for the interest spread. Suppose that shocks are still active in
period t. Then using the Markov structure, and equations (37), (40), and (41),
Et {∆et+1} = −(1− µ)(1− α)(1− υ)mLt
+µ(1− υ)αt+1 κ(1−µ)υ(2−α−µ)+κA + µκA.
= −(1− µ)(1− υ)(1− αt+1) κ(1−µ)υ(2−α−µ)+κA
+µ(1− υ)αt+1 κ(1−µ)υ(2−α−µ)+κA + µκA
= (1− υ)(αt+1 − 1) κ(1−µ)υ(2−α−µ)+κA + µ
[
κ+ (1− υ) κ(1−µ)υ(2−α−µ)+κ
]
A,
whence item (5.) in the proposition follows. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
E Dominant currency, stabilizing producer price inflation
Under otherwise the same assumptions as in Section 5.6, the current appendix derives the
response of the Home economy to Foreign monetary shocks if the Home central bank targets
producer-price inflation.
Proposition 6. Targeting producer price inflation. Consider the same conditions as in
Proposition 2. Let Home monetary policy target stable producer prices (πH,t = 0). Then, while
the foreign monetary shock lasts, the following is true:
1. Home output evolves according to
yLt = −υ(1− µ) ·A = υy∗L.
2. Home producer price inflation, by design, is zero πLH,t = 0.
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3. Home consumer price inflation is given by
πL0 = ν(1− µ) ·A, and πLt = 0 for t > 0.
4. The nominal exchange rate is given by
eLt = [1− µ+ (t+ 1)κ] ·A.






(1− µ)2 − κµ
]
·A, (43)
resulting from a change in the Foreign interest rate only.
Proof. With strict producer-price inflation targeting, πH,t = 0 (item (2.)) by design. Then,
from Phillips curve (22), we have that yt+υ ·mt = 0. Add υ ·mt to each side of the risk sharing
condition (26) and use yt + υ ·mt = 0 to simplify. This gives mt = −y∗t = (1− µ)A, where the
last step uses the law of motion for Foreign output from Proposition 1. Using this, one arrives
at the expression for yLt in item (1.) of Proposition 6. With πH,t = 0 (from the policy regime)





From (25) on, then, has that ∆et = ∆mt − π∗t . With the expression for mt derived earlier and
the law of motion for π∗t from Proposition 1, this gives item (4.) of the proposition. Item (3.)
follows from the definition of CPI inflation, equation (27), along with the earlier results. Last,
the interest differential in item (5.) follows from UIP, the derivation of which is described in
the proof of Proposition 5. To see that the rLt = 0, compare (43) to the Foreign interest rate
response in (32).
Under a dominant currency regime, targeting producer price inflation insulates producer
prices but neither domestic output nor consumer price inflation. Output in Home falls along
with Foreign output, and the more so, the more open the economy is (the lower home bias is,
that is, the closer υ to unity). The partial insulation of output that there is originates from
a sharp depreciation on impact, accommodated by a more accommodative monetary policy in
Home than in Foreign. Indeed, the interest rate in Home does not move at all upon the monetary
shock in Foreign; refer to equation (32) to see that the response of the interest differential in
(43) is due only to the Foreign interest rate. In sum, in a dominant-currency regime, flexible
exchange rates do not afford insulation of output at its natural level as long as monetary policy
targets inflation, be it producer price inflation (Proposition 6 above) or consumer-price inflation
(Proposition 5 in the main text).
F Producer currency pricing
For comparison, it is useful to inspect, if only briefly, producer currency pricing (PCP, hence-
forth). This is because PCP underpins the classic notion that flexible exchange rates provide
automatic insulation. Under PCP, targeting the producer price level amounts to targeting the
natural level of output. So the two regimes are equivalent, as Proposition 7 states. Under
producer currency pricing, equation (23) is replaced by the law of one price:
π∗H,t = πH,t − (et − et−1), (44)
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rendering the law-of-one-price gap zero (mt = 0 throughout).
Proposition 7. Divine coincidence under PCP. Consider the economy of Section 5. Let
pricing be given by PCP. Let the shocks be as described in Section 5.5. Let Home monetary policy
target the natural level of output (or, equivalently, target producer-price stability πH,t = 0). Then,
while the foreign monetary shock lasts, the following is true.
1. The terms of trade and output follow their natural values, so sLt = −y∗L and yt = 0.
2. Producer price inflation is zero πLH,t = 0.
3. Consumer price inflation is given by
πL0 = (1− µ)υ ·A, and πLt = 0 for t > 0.
4. The nominal exchange rate is given by
eLt = [(1− µ) + (t+ 1)κ] ·A = sLt − (t+ 1) · π∗L.
5. The interest rate in Home is rLt = 0, with the interest differential
rLt − r
∗,L
t = −[(1− µ)2 − κµ] ·A,
resulting from a change in the Foreign interest rate only.
Proof. With strict producer-price inflation targeting, πH,t = 0 by definition. Then, from Phillips
curve (22) we have that yt + υ ·mt = 0. With producer currency pricing mt = 0 (easily verified
using (25)), so that yt = 0. From risk sharing (26), then, st = −y∗t . Together this establishes
items (1.) and (2.) of the proposition. Using the law of one price, (44), with πH,t = 0, gives
π∗H,t = −∆et. Using this in the definition of the terms of trade, (24), yields ∆et = ∆st − π∗t ,
which together with the law of motion for Foreign output from Proposition 1 and st = −y∗t
yields item (4.) of the proposition. Item (3.) follows from the definition of consumer price
inflation in (27) and the earlier results. Item (5.) follows from UIP, where we derived UIP itself
in the proof of Proposition 5. To see that the rLt = 0, compare the interest differential in the
proposition here to the Foreign interest rate response in (32).
Compare Proposition 7 here to the corresponding Propositions 3 and 6 for the dominant
currency regime. As is well known, under PCP exchange rate adjustment lines up expenditure
switching with domestic output gap stabilization. In particular, in response to the fall in Foreign
demand, when monetary policy in Home targets producer prices, output in Home is perfectly
stabilized. And so is consumer price inflation in all but the initial period. Indeed, on impact,
the CPI inflation in Home rises, in line with the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Note
further that, in the special case shown here, the interest rate in Home need not move at all.
Rather, the interest gap required for the exchange rate to depreciate reflects the response of the
foreign interest rate only.
The evolution of the economy under fixed exchange rates is identical under PCP and DCP, see
Proposition 8. So, with fixed exchange rates, also under PCP, the economy would evolve as in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 8. Fixed exchange rate under PCP. Consider the same assumptions as in
Proposition 7, but let Home monetary policy target fixed exchange rates (et = 0). Then, the evo-
lution of the economy under PCP is identical to the evolution under DCP described in Proposition
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4. That is, under fixed exchange rates, the equilibrium of the PCP economy is the same as in
the DCP economy.
Proof. The key to seeing this is that the DCP and PCP economy have the same equilibrium,
whenever mt = 0 in the DCP economy (that is, if the law of one price holds under DCP). This
is the case here; see the proof of Proposition 4 in the main text.
What remains to be discussed is consumer-price inflation targeting under PCP. Also under
producer currency pricing shielding domestic activity from foreign shocks requires some initial
consumer-price inflation (compare Proposition 7). It may, therefore, be useful to spell out the
consequences of consumer price inflation targeting under PCP. We do so in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. Targeting consumer price inflation under PCP. Consider the same
assumptions as in Proposition 7, but Home monetary policy target consumer price stability














where α = 1 + κ/(2υ)−
√





υ[2− α− µ] + κ
·A.
2. Producer price inflation is
πLH,t = −υαt
κ(1− µ)
υ[2− α− µ] + κ
·A.
3. Consumer price inflation is zero, by construction.















υ[2− µ− α+ κ]
(
−(1− αt+1)(1− µ)(1− υ) + µ[1− µ+ υ(1− α) + κ]
)
·κ ·A.
Proof. Use the law of one price, (44), to substitute for π∗H,t in (24). Then, use the definition of
consumer price inflation (27) and πt = 0 (item (3.) ) to simplify. This yields πH,t = υ(st−1−st).
Substitute for πH,t in Phillips curve (22). Having substituted, too, for yt from (26) this yields
υ[st−1 − st] = υ[st − Etst+1] + κ[st + y∗t ].
Solving the difference equation in st for the stationary solution by the method of undetermined
coefficients, gives item (1.). Item (2.) follows from πH,t = υ(st−1 − st). Item (4.) follows using
the above solutions and the definition of consumer price inflation, (27), with πt = 0. Item (5.)
follows from UIP, where we derived UIP itself in the proof of Proposition 5.
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From this, CPI inflation targeting, also under PCP invites output spillovers. This is so, in
particular if prices are rather rigid. Indeed, in the limit, as κ→ 0, the evolution of the economy
with PCP and CPI targeting converges to that of a regime of fixed exchange rates.
G More general analytical solutions
Section 5 in the main text and the corresponding Appendix E and Appendix F have analyzed the
transmission of one shock to the Home economy: a foreign monetary policy shock. In addition,
for tractability, they had focused on the limit β → 1 and they had restricted labor supply to be
infinitely elastic, setting ϕ = 0. We did so for the sake of tractability.
This appendix, instead, provides more general results that relax the three assumptions. The
appendix spells out the response of the Home economy to any of the foreign shocks discussed
above. It allows labor supply to be inelastic. And it allows for any β ∈ (0, 1). We retain the
Markov structure of shocks, however, and continue to look at a linear approximation around the
non-stochastic steady state.
G.1 Linearized economy
So as to make this self-contained, we spell out all model equations even if this means that we
duplicate some from the main text. For the Home economy, all that matters in Foreign is the
evolution of the foreign level of output, y∗t , the foreign inflation rate, π
∗
t , and the foreign inter-
est rate, r∗t , and the foreign demand preference shock ξ
∗
t . The reason why the latter matters
is international consumption-risk sharing. For any shock, instead, that does not directly shift




t ) suffices to derive the
evolution of the Home economy. Note that the evolution in Foreign will be induced by a com-
bination of Foreign shocks and the response of Foreign monetary policy. Once the mapping is
done, however, foreign shocks other than preference shocks would not matter for Home indepen-




t ). In this sense, the structure that we present here is
not confined to a particular subset of shocks, but would allow for other shocks in Foreign as well.






The international risk sharing condition combined with the demand for Home-produced
goods
yt = st + y
∗
t − (1− υ)ξ∗t + (1− υ)mt. (45)
In equilibrium, Home output relates positively to the terms of trade, Foreign output, and the
demand shock in relative terms. The Home New Keynesian Phillips curve links Home producer-
price inflation to expected inflation and marginal costs:
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + κ [(1 + ϕ) yt + υmt − υξ∗t ] . (46)
Home marginal costs depend on the Home wage. The wage rises with demand for the domes-
tic good. Hence it is increasing in output. In addition, the wage will depend on preference
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shocks affecting the relative desire of Home and Foreign households to consume in the current
period.Export-price inflation differs across pricing scenarios. Under DCP we have
π∗H,t = βEtπ
∗
H,t+1 + κ [(1 + ϕ) yt − (1− υ)mt − υξ∗t ] . (47)
Alternatively, under PCP we have from the law of one price for exports: π∗H,t = πH,t − ∆et.
From (10), linearizing the Home terms of trade we have:
st = st−1 + π
∗
t − π∗H,t. (48)
Where π marks the inflation rate of the respective price indexes. The law-of-one-price gap, mt
takes the following form
mt = mt−1 + et − et−1 + π∗H,t − πH,t. (49)
As in the main text, consumer-price inflation in Home is given by the average of inflation rates
in the Home consumer’s basket
πt = (1− υ)πH,t + υ(π∗t + ∆et). (50)
The dynamic IS-relation in Home is derived by combining the first-order condition for con-
sumption and saving of Home households with the Home goods-market clearing condition, the
risk-sharing condition and the definition of the Home consumer-price index:
yt = Etyt+1 −
(
rt − Et(πH,t+1 + υ∆mt+1) + υEt∆ξ∗t+1
)
. (51)
yt, is Home output, rt the nominal interest rate in Home. Last, we would need to specify Home
monetary policy. We will do so below, in a way that binds rt, et, or πH,t. Combined with
a monetary policy rule and armed with the Foreign variables, the monetary policy rule and
equations (45) to (51) then form a system of eight variables in eight unknowns all of which are
linked to the evolution of the domestic economy.
The equations for the large foreign economy follow the conventional closed-economy New





rt − Et(π∗t+1) + Et∆ξ∗t+1
)
, (52)
and the New Keynesian Phillips curve in Foreign is given by
π∗t = βEtπ
∗
t+1 + κ (1 + ϕ) [y
∗
t − Z∗t ] . (53)
A foreign interest-rate rule completes the model environment. From here, as before, one could
derive the conventional UIP condition, (42).
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G.2 Flex-price benchmark





Not surprisingly, the natural level of output is not affected by the invoicing regime whatsoever.
The natural terms of trade while the shocks last are given by
snt =
1 + ϕ(1− υ)
1 + ϕ
ξ∗t − y∗t . (55)
G.3 The transmission of shocks in Foreign
As in the main text, we assume that all shocks originate in Foreign, and that these shocks
follow Markov processes and induce a Markov structure for foreign inflation, foreign output, the
foreign interest rate. We do so for tractability. Shocks may occur (and disappear) jointly, or
individually. The essence of the results below is not affected by this choice. Starting from the
non-stochastic steady state, in the first period there is a shock or a combination of shocks that
induces a response of foreign variables. In the next period, the shock remains present at that
level with probability µ. Else, the shock ceases. That is, we shall assume that while the shock






















L. Once the shock
ends, foreign variables immediately return to their steady state. Note that we do not need to







to pass. The following proposition summarizes one example.
Proposition 10. Consider the large economy sketched in Appendix G.1 and the shock structure
of Appendix G.3. For better readability, mark the external shocks in bold font (εm∗t , ξ
∗
t , and Z
∗
t )
Suppose monetary policy in Foreign perfectly stabilizes prices and output in Foreign once the









where εm∗t is a monetary shock that follows said Markov structure. Suppose that parameters are
such that there is determinacy. Then, while shocks last, output in Foreign will be
y∗L =
1




(φ− µ) · Z∗L + (1− µ) · ξ∗L − εm∗L
]
.








(1− µ) + γ
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Proof. Straightforward algebra using (52) and (53) along with Taylor rule (56) and the Markov
structure of shocks.
The following corollary highlights that Proposition 10 nests several special cases.
Corollary 2. Proposition 10 nests two important scenarios as a special case.
a) Inflation targeting in Foreign. Nested as φ→∞ and γ = 0. Then, y∗L = Z∗L, Π∗L = 0, and




b) The effective lower bound binds in Foreign. Suppose that while the shocks last, monetary






(1− µ)(1− βµ)− κ(1 + ϕ)µ
[
− κ(1 + ϕ)µ
1− βµ





(1− µ)(1− βµ)− κ(1 + ϕ)µ
[
− (1− µ) · Z∗L + (1− µ) · ξ∗L
]
.
Proof. The results follow directly from Proposition 10.
G.4 The response in Home under DCP
We are interested in understanding the role of the exchange rate as a shock absorber, in rela-
tion to the choice of monetary policy regime. Therefore, we solve the model under alternative
monetary and exchange rate regimes for Home, focusing on three of the scenarios that we had
also discussed in the main text. First, we look at a policy that stabilizes the natural rate of
output. This gives one end of the spectrum in terms of insulating domestic activity. Second,
we look at a policy that stabilizes domestic producer price inflation. We use this policy so as
to highlight that under DCP a focus on inflation implies output spillovers. Third, we look at a
policy that stabilizes the exchange rate (that is, a fixed exchange rate).32 We do this for both,
producer currency pricing and dominant-currency pricing. We start with dominant-currency
pricing. Appendix G.5 below shows the results for PCP. Throughout, we report the response of
the key variables while the shock lasts.
32These are the most tractable cases algebraically. For ϕ > 0, depending on monetary policy in Home, the
model may have two endogenous state-variables, st−1 and mt−1. This renders solutions in which the central
bank targets consumer price inflation algebraically cumbersome. The numerical simulations in Section 6 look at
targeting domestic consumer price inflation and producer prices.
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G.4.1 Natural-output policy under DCP, yt = y
n
t
The first scenario assumes that the domestic central bank sets interest rates so as to anchor
output at the natural level of output. Because of DCP, we know that there is no ‘divine
coincidence:’ closing the output gap does not stabilize inflation, and exchange rate movements
do not bring about efficient expenditure switching. As in the main text, in the following, we let
a superscript L on a variable, e.g., sLt , mark the variable while the shocks last.
Proposition 11. Consider the small Home economy discussed in Section G.1. Let pricing be
given by DCP. Let the shocks be as described in Section G.3, with the first period of the shock
being period 0. Let Home monetary policy target the natural level of output. Then, while the
shocks last, the following is true.
1. The terms of trade are given by




π∗L(1− βµ)− κy∗L + κ











(1 + β + κ)2 − 4β, and γyn = 1/(1 + β + κ − βαyn − βµ). One
can show that 0 < αyn < 1 and 0 < γyn <
1
κ .
Home output is given by the natural level of output in (54).




[π∗L −∆sLt ]. (58)
3. Home consumer price inflation is given by
πt = υ(∆st + ∆et). (59)










− (t+ 1) 1
1− υ
· π∗L. (60)




















t , where the last equation follows from (54).
Use this in Phillips curve (47), to get
π∗H,t = βEtπ
∗
H,t+1 − κ(1− υ)mt.
Use the risk sharing condition (45) along with the equilibrium yt to solve for
(1− υ)mt =
1 + ϕ(1− υ)
1 + ϕ
ξ∗t − st − y∗t .
Substitute this into the Phillips curve above. From the definition of the terms of trade (48) solve
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for π∗H,t and substitute this in the Phillips curve, giving
π∗t + st−1 − st = βEt
{
π∗t+1 + st − st+1
}
− κ1 + ϕ(1− υ)
1 + ϕ
ξ∗t + κst + κy
∗
t .
Solving this for sLt using the method of undetermined coefficients and the Markov structure of
the model yields the expression for sLt as the unique non-explosive solution (item (1.) ). Next,
observe from the two Phillips curves (46) and (47) and the solution for yt that (1 − υ)πH,t +








that is, equation (58) follows (item (2.)). The law of motion of the nominal exchange rate (item
(4.)) then follows from (49) using the intermediate solutions for mt and π
∗
H,t, πH,t. The interest
spread (item (5.)) follows from the UIP condition, which takes the familiar form (42). Item (3.)
follows from the definition of consumer price inflation, (50).
In order to put verbal content to this, consider – for the sake of exposition – an isolated fall in
foreign demand y∗L = −1, with π∗L = r∗L = ξ∗L = 0. This fall in foreign output does not affect the
natural level of output in Home, recall equation (54). A policy that stabilizes the output gap,
therefore, completely insulates output in the Home economy from the fall in foreign economic
activity. Under a policy of output gap targeting, the Home terms of trade deteriorate when
foreign output falls (Home-produced goods sold in Foreign become cheaper relative to Foreign-






(compare (16)), the deterioration of the terms of trade leads to expenditure switching by foreign
households. This alone is not sufficient, however, to perfectly stabilize domestic output. Rather,
perfect stabilization is achieved by the added effect of expenditure switching in Home. The
nominal exchange rate depreciates disproportionately, see equation (60). Recalling that under
DCP there is full pass-through of the exchange rate to import prices in Home, the depreciation is
key to expenditure switching by Home households toward Home-produced goods. Note that this
switching occurs in spite of the price level of Home-produced goods expressed in Home currency
rising on impact, equation (58). Combining this with the pass-through in import prices from
the exchange rate depreciation, consumer price inflation rises persistently, (59). Yet domestic
consumption is crowded in by a persistent cut in nominal interest rates (61). In sum, insulating
Home output from a fall in foreign economic activity means stimulating domestic demand and
tolerating producer-price and consumer-price inflation.
G.4.2 Stabilizing producer price inflation under DCP, πH,t = 0
We now consider a monetary policy that stabilizes producer price inflation (i.e. domestic
marginal costs) in all periods πH,t = 0. Again, lacking the divine coincidence property, sta-
bilizing marginal costs does not coincide with stabilizing the output gap. If monetary policy
resolves to stabilize producer prices, it positions itself in this trade-off.
Proposition 12. Consider the same conditions as in Proposition 11, but let Home monetary
policy target πH,t = 0. Then, while the shocks last, the following is true.
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1. The terms of trade are given by




















1 + β + κ 1+ϕ1+ϕ(1−υ)
]2
− 4β, and γπH = 1/(1 + β +





Further, απH < αy.
Home output is given by
yLt =
υ




2. By design, πLH,t = 0.





1 + ϕ(1− υ)
sL0 −
1 + ϕ




in the initial period, and by
πLt = −υ
ϕυ
1 + ϕ(1− υ)
αtπHs
L
0 , for t > 1.
4. The nominal exchange rate is given by
eLt = −
(









1 + ϕ(1− υ)
y∗L − (t+ 1)π∗L. (65)
5. The interest differential between Home and Foreign is given by
rLt − r
∗,L



























Proof. Item (2.), πH,t = 0, follows from the assumption on policy. Use Phillips curve (46) to
observe that under this policy (1+ϕ)yt+υ(mt−ξ∗t ) = 0. Using this expression in the risk sharing
condition (45) implies the expression for output in the proposition, (63). Substitute from here
in Phillips curve (47) such that inflation is forced by the terms of trade and foreign variables
only. Substitute for π∗H,t from (48). Solving by the method of undetermined coefficients for
a bounded solution yields (62). This proves item (1.). The other terms are determined in a
manner analogous to lines sketched in Proposition 11.
As before, for the verbal exposition we focus on a fall in foreign demand in isolation, y∗L = −1.
If the Home central bank targets domestic producer price inflation, the terms of trade still
deteriorate (as in the previous case). But now the foreign output shock does spill over to Home
output, see equation (63): Home output unambiguously falls. Relative to the case of natural
output targeting, with PPI targeting the nominal exchange rate (65) depreciates by less, and
domestic households do not switch expenditures to the same extent. Still, the consumer price
level in Home rises on impact, compare equation (64).
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In sum, a focus on inflation stabilization induces shocks to foreign demand to translate into
a fall of domestic activity. The numerical simulations of Section 6 in the main text show that
consumer price inflation targeting curbs the domestic demand stimulus (amid rising inflation) to
a still larger extent. This brings the response of output closer still to the case of fixed exchange
rates (a regime which prevents domestic demand stimulus altogether). We discuss the case of
fixed exchange rates next.
G.4.3 Fixed exchange rates under, DCP/PCP, et = 0
We now turn to the case of a fixed exchange rate. We consider a monetary policy that stabilizes
the exchange rate in all periods— the exchange-rate regime is assumed to be perfectly credible.
In the model spelled out above, when the exchange rate is credibly pegged, prices and allocations
are identical under DCP and PCP, the reasoning of Proposition 8 applying here, too; namely,
mt = 0 under DCP (see the proof to Proposition 13 below).
Proposition 13. Consider the same conditions as in Proposition 11, but let Home monetary
policy target et = 0. Then, while the shocks last, the following is true.
1. The terms of trade are given by













[1 + β + κ(1 + ϕ)]2 − 4β, and γe = 1/(1 + β + κ(1 + ϕ) −
βαe − βµ). One can show that 0 < αe < απH < 1 and 0 < γeκ(1 + ϕ) < 1.





L − (1− υ)ξ∗L. (68)





π∗L(1− βµ) + κ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)]ξ∗L − κ(1 + ϕ)y∗L
)
. (69)
3. Home consumer price inflation is given by
πLt = π
∗
L − (1− υ)αtesL0 . (70)
4. The nominal exchange rate is given by et = 0.
5. The interest differential between Home and Foreign is given by
rLt − r
∗,L
t = 0. (71)
The same would be true under PCP.
Proof. With fixed exchange rates item (4.) follows by assumption. Use the Phillips curves (46)
and (47) to arrive at the expression






From (49), with fixed exchange rates π∗H,t−πH,t = mt−mt−1. Substituting this for the differences
in the Phillips curves yields a linear homogeneous difference equation in mt. Hence, mt = 0,
whence π∗H,t = πH,t. In Phillips curve (46), substitute for yt from the risk sharing condition (45)
and use mt = 0. Use (48) with πH,t = π
∗
H,t to substitute for πH,t in the Phillips curve. The result
is a difference equation in st and Foreign driving terms. Solving this for st results in the stable
solution (67). Home output, then, follows from the risk sharing condition, giving item (1.) in
the proposition. Home producer price inflation then follows from (48) (with πH,t = pi
∗
H,t), giving
item (2.). Consumer price inflation follows directly from definition (50), using the aforementioned
results, item (3.). The interest spread, item (5.) immediately follows from UIP. Last, observe
that since πH,t = pi
∗
H,t and et = 0, π
∗
H,t = πH,t−∆et. The latter equation substitutes for Phillips
curve (47) under PCP. Since this is the only difference, and both equations hold, the same
derivations apply to PCP as well.
A fixed exchange rate means that Home monetary policy no longer can provide domestic
demand stimulus through the interest rate, equation (71). Buffering a fall in foreign demand,
thus, relies entirely on expenditure switching by domestic and foreign households. At the same
time, domestic expenditure switching is limited—driven by price adjustment only. Also under
a peg, the terms of trade deteriorate in response to a contraction in foreign output, favoring
expenditure switching by foreign households. In order to have domestic expenditure switching
in Home, producer price inflation in Home has to fall. It does, but only gradually, (69). In
addition, home CPI inflation falls (70). Output unambiguously falls, and more strongly so than
in the previous scenarios, see equation (68). In sum, an exchange rate peg means that a Foreign
fall in demand results in a fall in inflation in Home, and a fall in output in Home. That is, a
fixed exchange rate neither achieves stabilization of inflation, nor of output.
G.5 The response in Home under PCP
For comparison, it is useful to inspect, if only briefly, producer currency pricing. This is because
PCP underpins the classic notion that flexible exchange rates provide automatic insulation.
Under PCP, targeting the producer price level amounts to targeting the natural level of output.
So the two regimes are equivalent, as Proposition 14 states. We wish to emphasize that the
two parameter restrictions that we keep entertaining are η = 1 (a unitary trade elasticity), and
α = 0 (no use of intermediate inputs in production). All other parameters are left unrestricted.
The result, thus, is true for any of the shocks that we entertain, any labor supply elasticity, and
any Foreign monetary policy.
Proposition 14. Consider the economy of Section G.1. Let pricing be given by PCP. Let the
shocks be as described in Section G.3, with the first period of the shock being period 0. Let Home
monetary policy target the natural level of output (or, equivalently, target producer-price stability
πH,t = 0). Then, while the shocks last, the following is true.
1. The terms of trade are given by
sLt =
1 + ϕ(1− υ)
1 + ϕ
ξ∗L − y∗L, (72)
that is, the terms of trade are constant.
Output is given by (54).
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2. Home producer price inflation by πH,t = 0.
3. Home consumer price inflation is given by
πL0 = −υy∗L + υ




πLt = 0, t > 0. (74)
4. The nominal exchange rate is given by
eLt =
1 + ϕ(1− υ)
1 + ϕ
ξ∗L − y∗L − (t+ 1) · π∗L. (75)
5. The interest differential is given by
rLt − r
∗,L
t = −µπ∗L + (1− µ)
(
y∗L −





The nominal rate in Home, in turn is given by




Proof. With πH,t = 0, the Phillips curve (46) gives that output is equals natural output, and
vice versa, establishing item (2.). The risk sharing condition (45) can then be used to solve
for the terms of trade, (72), establishing item (1.). The evolution of the nominal exchange rate
(item (4.)) follows from (48) and the law of one price (that prevails under PCP and translates
to π∗H,t = πH,t−∆et). Given these results, the interest differential (item (5.)) follows from UIP.
The nominal rate in Home follows by deriving and substituting r∗t from (52) using the Markov
structure. Consumer price inflation (item (3.)) follows from definition (50).
As is well known, under PCP exchange rate adjustment lines up expenditure switching with
domestic output gap stabilization. In particular, in response to the fall in Foreign demand,
when monetary policy in Home targets producer prices, output in Home is perfectly stabilized.
And so is consumer price inflation in all but the initial period, see equation (74). Indeed, on
impact, the consumer price inflation in Home rises, equation (73), in line with the depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate, (75), which – in turn – is brought about by a cut in Home’s
interest rate in response to a fall in Foreign demand. Producer currency pricing underlies much
of the intuition of flexible exchange rates serving as an optimal stabilizer. Proposition 14 shows
why. Namely, for all shocks other than the preference shocks (which affect natural output) full
insulation of output is achieved without any change (in equilibrium) of Home’s interest rate.
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H Impact effect:
isolated change in foreign demand, inflation, or preferences
Appendix G documents the evolution of prices and quantities in Home in response to foreign
shocks. The corresponding propositions yield results that some readers may find somewhat
unwieldy. Therefore, in order to make those results more accessible, this Appendix collects the
response in the initial period only; and provides signs. We look at isolated changes in foreign
demand, inflation, or preferences.
Table H.4: Impact effect, DCP, yt = y
n
t
y∗L = −1 π∗L = −1 ξ∗L = −1
yL0 0 0 − υ1+ϕ < 0
















1−υ υ(−γyn(1− βµ) +
1


















Notes: Sign of impact response for “recessionary” shocks in Foreign, under DCP with natural output targeting.
The model economy is as defined in Appendix G. A positive sign for s0 means the terms of trade deteriorate
(Home goods get cheaper abroad). A positive sign for e0 means the nominal exchange rate depreciates. The
results here follow directly from Proposition 11.
Table H.5: DCP, πH,t = 0

























































πLH,0 0 0 0
Notes: Same as Table H.4, but for producer-price inflation targeting. The results here follow directly from
Proposition 12.
Table H.6: DCP and PCP, et = 0
y∗L = −1 π∗L = −1 ξ∗L = −1
yL0 γeκ(1 + ϕ)− 1 < 0 −γe(1− βµ) < 0 (1− υ)− γeκ(1 + ϕ(1− υ)) S 0
sL0 γeκ(1 + ϕ) > 0 −γe(1− βµ) < 0 −γeκ(1 + ϕ(1− υ)) < 0
eL0 0 0 0
πL0 −γeκ(1− υ)(1 + ϕ) < 0 − [1− γe(1− υ)(1− βµ)] S 0 γeκ(1− υ)[1 + ϕ(1− υ)] > 0
πLH,0 −γeκ(1 + ϕ) < 0 − [1− γe(1− βµ)] S 0 γeκ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)] > 0
Notes: Same as Table H.4, but for a fixed exchange rate. The evolution of the economy is identical under DCP
and PCP. The results here follow directly from Proposition 13.
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Table H.7: PCP, ynt = 0 (or, equivalently, πH,t = 0)
y∗L = −1 π∗L = −1 ξ∗L = −1
yL0 0 0 − υ1+ϕ < 0
sL0 1 0 −
1+ϕ(1−υ)
1+ϕ < 0
eL0 1 1 −
1+ϕ(1−υ)
1+ϕ < 0
πL0 υ > 0 0 −υ
1+ϕ(1−υ)
1+ϕ < 0
πLH,0 0 0 0
Notes: Same as Table H.4, but for the case of PCP with either output gap targeting or, equivalently, producer
price inflation targeting. The results here follow directly from Proposition 14.
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I Additional simulations
The current Appendix provides additional simulations. These extend the results in Section 6 of
the main text in three dimensions. While the main text has shown simulation results for DCP
only, Appendix I.1 shows results also for PCP and for local currency pricing (LCP). Appendix I.2
provides simulations when Home monetary policy follows an interest rate feedback rule, rather
than a targeting rule (the assumption in the main text). Appendix I.3 completes that results
that we show in Section 6.3 of the main text. Namely, the appendix shows the response in the
ELB scenario of that section, when Home monetary policy lacks history dependence.
I.1 Alternative pricing regimes
Our baseline model used in the main text features DCP. For comparison, we here present sim-
ulation results for two alternative pricing regimes, producer currency pricing (PCP) and local
currency pricing (LCP). Figures (I.6) and (I.7) show the responses of the Home economy to
a Foreign monetary policy shock. The parameter calibration is identical to the one used in
the main text. We focus on the case of a floating exchange rate, since the responses under an
exchange rate peg are invariant to the pricing regime.
The left columns of the two figures show responses under DCP, the case discussed in the
main text. The middle columns show responses under PCP. When the Home monetary authority
pursues consumer price inflation targeting, the responses of Home variables are very similar to
those under DCP. That is, consistent with our empirical results, the drop in output is essentially
as large as under a peg. We observe more substantial differences between DCP and PCP, when
the Home monetary authority targets producer price inflation. Under PCP, the so-called divine
coincidence holds, meaning that stable producer prices are commensurate with a closed output
gap. Consequently, the drop in output is much smaller under PCP than under DCP. Under
PCP, the depreciation of the Home exchange rate deteriorates the Home terms of trade and
leads to expenditure switching of both Home and Foreign households and firms towards goods
produced in Home, as shown by the increase in the Home export-import ratio.
The right columns of the two figures show responses under LCP. When prices in both coun-
tries are sticky in local currency, consumer price inflation targeting is associated with a somewhat
smaller drop in output than under DCP. That’s because when Home import prices are sticky in
domestic currency, the Home monetary authority lowers the interest rate more aggressively in
response to the shock and allows the exchange rate to depreciate without compromising stable
consumer prices. Producer price inflation targeting and output gap targeting feature output
responses that are similar to those under DCP, though there are more pronounced differences
in the responses of some other Home variables.33 For instance, the interest rate response in
Home is more accommodative under LCP than under DCP, and this is reflected in a stronger
depreciation of the Home exchange rate. The terms of trade, on the other hand, appreciate
under LCP whereas they remain largely unaffected by the foreign shock under DCP.
All in all, our two main results from the main text are robust to assuming either PCP or
33Under LCP, we consider the same path of Home natural output as under DCP and PCP, i.e. we consider a
flexible-price equilibrium for the Home economy where the law of one price holds for goods imported from the
Foreign economy.
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Figure I.6: Adjustment to Foreign monetary policy shock: Alternative pricing regimes
DCP PCP LCP
Note: Inflation rates and interest rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations from steady state. ∆
Interest rate denotes the difference between the response of the Home and Foreign interest rate.
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Figure I.7: Adjustment to Foreign monetary policy shock: Alternative pricing regimes
DCP PCP LCP
Note: Inflation rates and interest rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations from steady state.
LCP instead of DCP. First, when the Home monetary authority targets consumer price inflation,
then the output response to a Foreign monetary policy shock under a floating exchange rate is
similar in magnitude to the one under an exchange rate peg. Second, under a floating exchange
rate, lack of output insulation is first and foremost a policy choice. That is, the Home monetary
authority can, in principle, choose a monetary policy strategy that insulates Home output from
the Foreign monetary policy shock.
I.2 Feedback rules
In the baseline model used in the main text, Home monetary policy is governed by a targeting
rule. For comparison, we here present simulation results for the case where if the exchange rate
is flexible, the Home monetary policy sets the interest rate in accordance with a simple feedback
rule
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) (αππt + αyyt) . (77)
We compare two parameterizations of the rule. Under the first parameterization, monetary
policy responds aggressively to consumer price inflation, but does not respond to economic
activity, απ = 8 and αy = 0. Under the second parameterization, monetary policy responds to
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Figure I.8: Adjustment to Foreign monetary policy shock: Feedback rules
Foreign Home: peg Home: float
Note: Inflation rates and interest rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations from steady state. ∆
Interest rate denotes the difference between the response of the Home and Foreign interest rate.
both consumer price inflation and economic activity, απ = 1.5 and αy = 0.5. For both rules, we
set ρr = 0.5. All other parameters, including those for the Foreign monetary policy rule, take
on the values used in the main text.
Figure I.8 shows responses of the Foreign and Home variables to a Foreign monetary policy
shock. Responses of the Foreign variables (left column) and the Home variables in case of a
peg (middle column) are identical to those in the main text. Responses of the Home variables
in case of a floating exchange rate depend on the Home monetary policy rule (right column).
When the Home policy rule responds aggressively to consumer price inflation, the Home interest
rate increases by more than the Foreign policy rate and consumer price inflation increases only
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Figure I.9: Adjustment to Foreign monetary policy shock
Exchange rate Terms of trade Export-Import ratio
slightly. Stable consumer prices come, however, at the cost of a drop in output that is almost
as large as under an exchange rate peg. The responses of Home variables under this feedback
rule is thus similar to the responses under consumer price inflation targeting.
Instead, when the Home policy rule responds also to fluctuations in economic activity, and
the response coefficient to inflation is closer to one, the Home interest rate path is more accom-
modative than the Foreign interest rate path. The Home exchange rate depreciates–see Figure
I.9–and consumer price inflation surges on impact. Letting inflation rise comes at the benefit of
a roughly stable output gap. The responses of Home variables under this alternative feedback
rule are thus similar to the responses under output gap targeting.
I.3 Lack of insulation at the effective lower bound
In the ELB scenario of section 6.3 with flexible exchange rates, we consider alternative history-
dependent monetary policy regimes in Home. Here, instead, we consider the case where Home
monetary policy lacks history dependence. The right column of Figure I.10 shows the responses
of Home variables for three regimes of this class, consumer price inflation targeting (black line
with squares), producer price inflation targeting (blue line with circles) and output gap targeting
(red line with diamonds). For convenience, we also show again the responses of Foreign variables
(left column) and the responses of Home variables under the exchange rate peg (middle column).
In our simulation, all three flexible exchange-rate regimes fail to provide any meaningful insula-
tion of Home output at the ELB.
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Figure I.10: ELB scenario
Foreign Home: peg Home: float
Note: Inflation rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations from steady state. Interest rates are
expressed in annualized percent.
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